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COMMENT 
ARE RULE 26(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS 
VIABLE AGAINST GRAND JURIES? 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTS BALANCING 
TEST IN FAVOR OF A PER SE RULE: 
UNITED STATES v. JANET GREESON'S A 
PLACE FOR US (IN RE GRAND JURY 
SUBPOENA SERVED ON MESERVE) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us (In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve), the Ninth Circuit 
addressed an issue of first impression, namely whether a 
grand jury subpoena requesting certain information would 
prevail over a validly issued civil protective order sealing that 
same information.l The court adopted the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits' per se rule that a grand jury subpoena automati-
cally prevails over a validly issued protective order, and relied 
on their reasoning to reject the Second Circuit's test that bal-
ances competing interests under the specific facts of each case.2 
1. United States v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us (In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes), 62 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 1995) 
[hereinafter "Janet Greeson's APFU"J. See infra notes 236-52 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit case. 
2. [d. at 1226; See Martindell v. IT&T, 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) (the 
Martindell test establishes a rebuttable presumption against modifying a protective 
order. The government can meet its burden and rebut this presumption using the 
specific facts of the case to establish improvidence in the grant of the order, ex-
183 
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By adopting the per se rule based on the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits' discussion of the issue without adding any origi-
nal analysis, the Ninth Circuit also adopted the problems pres-
ent in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' opinions.3 Specifical-
ly, these courts weighed the competing interests in the ab-
stract and declined to establish a presumption to modify or 
uphold a protective order.4 To resolve these problems, the 
Ninth Circuit could have weighed the competing interests, 
established a presumption, and then permitted the party with 
the burden to overcome the presumption by showing that the 
initial balance of competing interests should be altered under 
the specific facts of the case.5 Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopt-
ed the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' rejection of a balancing 
test in favor of a non-rebuttable presumption in the form of a 
per se rule that permits the government unbridled access to 
civil discovery material that litigants wanted kept confiden-
tia1.6 
This comment compares the Fourth, Eleventh, and Ninth 
Circuits' per se rule with the Second Circuit's balancing ap-
proach. It concludes that the courts adopting the per se rule 
made unwarranted findings by overstating the reach of protec-
tive orders by construing them as improper "de facto" grants of 
immunity.7 The courts also understated the retained power of 
traordinary circumstances, or a compelling need.). See infra notes 253-66 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
3. See Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226 (based on the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits' discussion of the "various factors," the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
per se rule). See infra notes 253-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
4. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988); Grand Jury Proceeding (Billy J. Williams, GJ88-1) 
[hereinafter "Williams"] v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1993). 
See infra notes 165-235 and accompanying text discussing Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits' cases. 
5. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (establishes a presumption and then per-
mits the burdened party to overcome the presumption by demonstrating improvi-
dence in the grant of the order, a compelling need, or an extraordinary circum-
stance). 
6. See Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226 (the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' arguments); Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 
1479 (Sprouse J. dissenting) (the per se rule permits the government unbridled 
access to protected discovery material). See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the per se rule. 
7. See Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226 (the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
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a grand jury by declining to recognize that even when a protec-
tive order exists, a grand jury can still call witnesses, have a 
court compel testimony, or use leaked information for prosecu-
tion even though it is sealed.s Further, these courts could have 
applied a balancing approach without experiencing the prob-
lems they suggest such an approach creates. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To determine whether a grand jury subpoena prevails over 
a civil protective order, a court must weigh the competing 
interests served by grand juries and protective orders.9 This 
background section reviews the relevant history and purpose of 
grand juries and protective orders under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (hereinafter "FRCP"). This overview should 
assist the reader in understanding the competing policies dis-
cussed by the courts of appeal. 
A. DISCOVERY AND PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 1 of the FRCP states that the rules "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action."lo Protective orders, as authorized under 
Rule 26(c), must be construed to secure these goals. ll Protec-
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits arguments). Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 
1475; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18 (courts overstated reach of protective orders). 
See also infra notes 301-323 and accompanying text for a discussion and critique 
of courts' finding that protective orders are equal to immunity. 
8. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480 
(Sprouse J. dissenting) (courts understated the retained power of the grand jury). 
See also infra notes 317-322 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc-
tion between protective orders and immunity. See generally, Robert Heidt, The 
Conjurer's Circle, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1095-96 (1982) (discussing problems and 
proposed solutions including the use of protective orders, when a civil litigant 
asserts his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
9. Martindell v. IT&T, 594 F.2d 291, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1471 (4th Cir. 1988). 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The relevant part of Rule 1 states "These rules ... 
shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Id. 
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26(c). Protective orders were moved to Rule 26(c) when 
the 1970 amendments made Rule 26 the general rule for all discovery. 8 CHARLES 
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2003 
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tive orders promote the ')ust" determination of actions by safe-
guarding parties and witnesses against the almost unlimited 
right of discovery found in Rule 26(b)(1).12 As discovery rules 
have become more liberal over time, the role of protective or-
ders has broadened. In this section, Rule I's interest in a ')ust" 
determination establishes the role of protective orders to pro-
(1994). The full text of Rule 26(c) reads as follows: 
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, accompanied by a certificate that the 
movant in good faith has conferred or attempted to confer 
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dis-
pute without court action, and for good cause shown, the 
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on 
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district 
where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) 
that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the 
disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified 
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time 
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a 
method of discovery other than that selected by the party 
seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired 
into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that the discovery be con-
ducted with no one present except persons designated by 
the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be 
opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret 
or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information not be revealed or be revealed only in a des-
ignated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file speci-
fied documents or information enclosed in sealed enve-
lopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
12. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2036 (citing United States v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 666 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1982)). The scope of 
discovery is defined generally in Rule 26(b)(1) as follows: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the 
claim or defense of any other party, including the exis-
tence, description, nature, custody, condition and location 
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. The information sought need not be 
admissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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tect parties and witnesses from discovery abuse. Next, this 
section establishes how protective orders promote the "speedy 
and inexpensive" policy of Rule 1. Finally, Rule 26(c)'s require-
ment that the moving party demonstrate "good cause" before a 
court issues a protective order will be discussed. 
1. Policy Interest in Furthering "Just" Resolution of Disputes 
Prior to adoption of the FRCP, parties in civil litigation 
had no duty to disclose facts or evidence to the opposing par-
ty.13 The Supreme Court significantly broadened parties' 
rights to discovery by adopting the FRCP in 1938.14 Original-
ly, FRCP provisions regarding the scope of discovery applied 
only to depositions. IS In 1970, amendments expanded Rule 26, 
governing the scope of discovery, to become a general rule 
applicable to all discovery devices. 16 However, in 1948, the 
FRCP expanded the scope of discovery further to apply to in-
terrogatories and reql,lests for admissions. 17 Since protective 
orders modify the scope of discovery, they were also expanded 
and logically combined in the 1970 amendments within Rule 
26.18 
After The Supreme Court adopted the FRCP and its subse-
quent amendments, courts followed the Supreme Court's direc-
tion that "the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly 
and liberally as possible" to enable parties "to obtain the full-
est possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."ID 
13. Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1955). 
14. [d. The scope of discovery broadened to allow discovery of anything that 
might conceivably help in preparing the case. Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protec-
tive Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991). 
15. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2007. Courts applied the Rule 26 
definition of scope to production and interrogatories. [d. This result was codified in 
1948. [d. 
16. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2003. The 1970 amendments also 
added trade secrets and other confidential commercial information to information 
that could be sealed under a protective order. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(c)(7). The adviso-
ry committee notes acknowledge that this codified standard practice. 8 WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 11, § 2043. 
17. Miller, supra note 14, at 450 n.116. 
18. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, §§ 2003, 2007. The consolidation also 
allowed judges to manage the discovery process more effectively. Miller, supra note 
14, at 452. 
19. Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 
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Under this liberal policy, parties could no longer object to dis-
covery on the basis that the information sought was irrelevant 
or that opposing counsel was on a "fishing expedition.,,20 Con-
cern over litigants' abuse of liberal discovery resulted in pro-
posals for further amendments.21 Subsequent amendments 
did not alter the scope of discovery, but the 1983 amendments 
gave courts responsibility for monitoring discovery.22 Because 
Congress was unable to form a rule to govern all the situations 
that might require limits on discovery, it left the responsibility 
to the trial judge to decide what, if any, restrictions might be 
warranted in a particular case.23 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 
(1947)). 
20. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2007 (expansion of Rule 26 and 
cases cited regarding scope of discovery). 
21. Miller, supra note 14, at 453 (proposals included requests for tighter con-
trol over the discovery process and more effective judicially applied remedies); See 
also 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2003.1. -The ABA advisory committee's 
draft proposal for limiting the scope of discovery was criticized. A memorandum by 
the Chairman of the advisory committee on the civil rules stated that 
Many believe the present rule is working well. A number 
disputed the assumption that there was general abuse of 
discovery. . . . It was objected that discovery could not be 
restricted to issues because one of the purposes of discov-
ery was to determine issues. .. Many commentators 
feared that if discovery were restricted to issues or claims 
or defenses there would be a return to detailed pleading 
or a resort of 'shotgun' pleading, with multitudes of is-
sues, claims and defenses, leading to an increase in dis-
covery motions without any reduction in discovery. 
8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2003.1 n.12 (quoting a memorandum from 
Judge Walter R. Mansfield to Judge Roszel Thomsen (June 14, 1979), reprinted in 
85 F.R.D. 538). A revised draft was criticized for not going far enough to curb 
discovery abuse, but no rule could be formed to deal with all the situations that 
may require limitations on discovery or to identify what types of limitations 
should be imposed in those specific cases. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, §§ 
2003.1, 2036. 
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I). Four years earlier, the Supreme Court held that 
discovery, like all of the FRCP, is subject to Rule 1 and that district courts should 
not neglect their Rule 26(c) power to restrict discovery and protect parties from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Hervert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Miller, supra note 14, at 456 (amendments re-
flected judgment that primary problem with discovery was judicial hesitancy to 
seize control of the process). 
23. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, §§ 2003.1 n.15, 2036 (includes cited 
cases that establish trial court's discretion). Rule 26 lists eight kinds of protective 
orders, but a judge may be inventive in making an order to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. 8 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2036. 
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Broad discovery was intended to improve the dispute reso-
lution system, not to undermine parties' rights and privileg-
es.24 Nevertheless, the expanded scope of discovery, and the 
increased information this change generated, posed threats to 
privacy and confidentiality.25 As a result, amendments to the 
FRCP fashioned protective orders as a trade-off between main-
taining liberal discovery and protecting both individual and 
societal rights and privileges.26 
If a party is denied discovery because the court is unable 
to fashion a protective order inducing a deponent to waive 'a 
claimed privilege, individuals and society are harmed.27 Pro-
tective orders can prevent harm to individuals by restricting 
the dissemination of private or confidential information.28 Pro-
tective orders can also prevent societal harm that occurs when 
a party refuses to resort to the courts or settles a case to avoid 
producing information she does not want made public.29 Addi-
tionally, protective orders reduce harm to society that occurs 
when parties unnecessarily contest discovery or fail to disclose 
all the information they have.30 
2. Policy Interest in Efficient Resolution of Disputes 
Protective orders serve the policy interest of efficient dis-
pute resolution because they restrict the dissemination of dis-
covery material reducing the likelihood that information will 
be misused.31 Protective orders are well suited to alleviating 
protected parties' fear of disclosure by managing the flow of 
24. Miller, supra note 14, at 466; see also Marcus, supra note 19, at 6 (the 
intrusive and burdensome nature of discovery is the most cited objection to litiga-
tion); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (sole purpose of liber-
al discovery is for preparation of trial or settlement of litigated disputes). 
25. Miller, supra note 14, at 447; Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34-36 (the court 
recognized privacy as a right implied in Rule 26(c) and authorized the grant of 
protective orders). 
26. Miller, supra note 14, at 441 (quoting Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34). 
27. Marcus, supra note 19, at 21. 
28. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34-35. 
29. Miller, supra note 14, at 446; Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 36 n.22 (The 
United States Supreme court agreed with the Washington State Supreme Court 
that unimpeded access to the courts is an important interest.). 
30. [d. at 446, 483; Marcus, supra note 19, at 21. 
31. See Miller, supra note 14, at 446, 483. 
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information to litigants while minimizing potential discovery 
abuse.32 One judge noted that he was "unaware of any case in 
the past half-dozen years of even a modicum of complexity 
where an umbrella protective order ... has not been agreed to 
by the parties and approved by the court. ,,33 Parties and 
courts often stipulate to umbrella protective orders to avoid the 
expense and delay of debating detailed provisions.34 
In addition to protecting rights, protective orders reduce 
the burden on courts by resolving discovery disputes and en-
abling litigants to proceed with litigation.35 Placing limita-
tions on the court's ability to issue protective orders would 
undermine the traditional discovery premise that "the need for 
the information is held paramount."36 
Commentators and judges have identified that settlement 
is a legitimate and desirable goal, and recognize that far more 
cases are settled than tried.37 Protective orders play an impor-
tant role in meeting this goal since making information avail-
able can increase the likelihood of settlement.38 Regarding the 
public's right to sealed information, the Supreme Court held 
that, since protective orders serve a substantial governmental 
interest in curbing discovery abuse, restricting access to discov-
ery material does not violate any First Amendment right.39 
The court stated that "[p]retrial depositions and interrogatories 
are not public components of a civil trial."40 Further, although 
a judge can vacate or modify a protective order, they remain 
actual restraints on discovery.41 The judge controls the level 
of access a party has to protected information, and can issue 
32. See id.; Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35-36. 
33. Marcus, supra note 19, at 9 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 18 . 
. 36. Marcus, supra note 19, at 21 (quoting Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil 
Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965)). 
37. Marcus, supra note 19, at 27. 
38. [d. 
39. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35-36. 
40. [d. at 33. The court elaborated that "[d]iscovery rarely takes place in pub-
lic. Depositions are scheduled at times and places most convenient to those in-
volved. Interrogatories are answered in private." [d. at 33 n.19. 
41. Marcus, supra note 19, at 18-19. 
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additional restrictions regarding any modification.42 
3; "Good Cause" as a Prerequisite to Issuing a Protective 
Order 
To request a Rule 26(c) protective order, a moving party 
must show "good cause" for her motion.43 The outcome of a 
motion to modify or vacate a protective order is likely to de-
pend on whether there is or was "good cause" for the order. 44 
However, the FRCP does not define "good cause.,,45 The Sec-
ond Circuit used "improvidence" as a measure of the necessary 
"good cause.,,46 Other courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have found that "good cause" is satisfied if the order curbs 
discovery abuse.47 Using either of these tests, the "good cause" 
requirement has not created an insurmountable barrier to 
upholding a protective order.48 
42. FED. R. CN. P. 26(c); Marcus, supra note 19, at 18-19; Miller, supra note 
14, at 435 n.23 (citing 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2043 and quoting Justice Holmes' 
classic statement: 
It will be understood that if in the opinion of the trial 
judge, it is or should become necessary to reveal the 
secrets to others, it will rest in the judges discretion to 
determine whether, to whom, and under what precautions, 
the revelation should be made. 
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917)). 
43. FED. R. CN. P. 26(c) (a court may grant a protective order limiting, elim-
inating, or shielding discovery from public disclosure upon a showing of good 
~~a~ . 
44. See generally, Jacqueline S. Guenego, Trends in Protective Orders Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c): Why Some Cases Fumble While Others Score, 
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (1991) (discussing methods for obtaining protective orders 
and the validity of each). 
45. See FED. R. CN. P. 26(c). 
46. See Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66 (defining improvidence as when the order 
should not have been granted because it would facilitate or further criminal activi-
ty). 
47. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35-36 (the purpose of protective orders is to 
curb abuse stemming from liberal discovery. An order protecting privacy establish-
es good cause and is sufficient to overcome a First Amendment challenge.); see 
also Guenego, supra note 44, at 563, 569-71 (discussing what has constituted "good 
ca~e"). 
48. Guenego, supra note 44, at 569-71. 
9
Steffenson: Grand Jury Subpoena Powers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
192 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:183 
B. HISTORY OF THE GRAND JURY'S POWER 
Historians trace the grand jury to 1166, the year of King 
Henry II's Assize of Clarendon.49 In creating a grand jury, the 
King did not intend to create a shield for citizens.5o Instead, 
he established the grand jury as a weapon against the church 
and feudal barons.51 An accusation by the Grand Assize insti-
gated a "trial by ordeal.,,52 In 1215, trial by ordeal was abol-
ished, but the accused was still tried by his accusers. 53 Secre-
cy of deliberations and jurors separate from those who had 
accused the defendant did not become common practice until 
the middle of the fourteenth century. 54 The modern concept of 
the grand jury as a protector of citizens against unfounded 
charges and oppressive government did not substantially 
emerge until 1681.55 
Early colonists brought the grand jury concept to the Unit-
ed States.56 The Founders incorporated the role of the grand 
jury in the Constitution.57 According to the Supreme Court, 
grand juries were "to provide a fair method for instituting 
criminal proceedings against persons believed to have commit-
ted crimes."58 The grand jury serves as the citizens' primary 
security against the possibility of hasty, malicious or oppres-
49. MARVIN E. FRANKEL AND GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 6 (1977). 
50. Id. at 7. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. Four methods of trial by ordeal were available; all very similar in 
result. One method involved throwing the accused into water. If he sank he was 
innocent, but if he swam he would be found guilty. Id. 
53. Id. at 9. Grand juries were still likely to find defendants guilty since royal 
judges could fine and imprison jurors who attempted to acquit. Id. 
54. Frankel, supra note 49 at 9. 
55. Id. The case of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, and Stephen Colledge estab-
lished this role for the grand jury. Id. King Charles II convened the grand jury 
against these two vocal Protestants who opposed his attempt to reestablish the 
Catholic Church in England. Id. The grand jury insisted upon secrecy in its pro-
ceedings. Id. Thus, jurors could not be fined or imprisoned for not returning an 
indictment. Id. The jurors did not return an indictment, however, the King simply 
convened a second grand jury in the friendlier town of Oxford, which complied 
with the King's wishes. Id. at 9-10. 
56. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1955). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. Historically, grand jurors were noted to be "neither accusers, nor wit-
nesses exactly; they simply give voice to common repute." Wood v. Georgia, 370 
U.S. 375, 390 (l962). 
10
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sive prosecution.59 However, the grand jury is also an impor-
tant instrument of effective law enforcement, which requires 
extensive and thorough investigations to serve society's inter-
est in determining whether a crime has been committed and 
who committed it.60 The Supreme Court identified these con-
flicting roles finding the grand jury responsible for both deter-
mining whether probable cause exists to believe a crime has 
been committed and protecting citizens from unfounded crimi-
nal prosecutions.61 
To adequately determine whether and against whom crim-
inal proceedings should be instituted, the grand jury requires 
broad investigative powers.62 The United States Supreme 
Court has found this investigative role to be fundamental to 
secure the safety of citizens and their property.63 Courts look 
to the grand jury's history to define its scope, because the Su-
preme Court held that "our constitutional grand jury was in-
tended to operate substantially like its English progenitor.,,64 
Regarding the availability of evidence, the Supreme Court held 
that, like the English, American grand juries can request a 
court to compel a witness to appear and testify concerning any 
pending cause or matter.65 The court found this "sacrifice" to 
be a necessary individual contribution for the public's wel-
59. Wood, 370 u.s. at 390. 
60. Id. at 392. 
61. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972). 
62. Id. at 700. 
63. Id. 
64. Costello, 350 U.S. at 362. English grand juries were not hampered by evi-
dentiary, procedural, or technical rules and eventually freed themselves from the 
crown and judges' control. Id. As late as 1927, proceedings were held in secrecy 
and English jurors could act on their own knowledge about the case. Id. The mod-
em result is that courts will not challenge indictments on the ground that they 
are not supported by adequate or competent evidence. [d. at 364. In 1955, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld an indictment based on hearsay. [d. at 361. 
The Supreme Court also approved of an indictment based on evidence obtained in 
violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. Lawn v. United States, 355 
U.S. 339 (1958). 
65. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 278 (1918). As early as 1612, Eng-
land declared that "all subjects, without distinction of degrees, owe to the King 
tribute and service, not only of their deed and hand, but of their knowledge and 
discovery. [d. at 279-80. The power of federal courts to compel persons to appear 
and testify has been well established. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 
(1972). The Supreme Court has also recognized the obligation of every citizen to 
testify. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); United States v. Bry-
an, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
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fare. 66 The Supreme Court also held that the duty to testify is 
so necessary to the administration of justice that an 
individual's burden, embarrassment, injury to economic and 
social status, and interest in privacy must yield to the over-
riding public interest in full disclosure.67 The court further 
held that "the inquisitorial function of the grand jury and the 
compulsion of witnesses were recognized as incidents of the 
judicial power of the United States."68 
To protect the grand jury's power, courts have rejected 
numerous challenges to its authority.69 For example, the Su-
preme Court held that a grand jury subpoena is not a search 
and seizure within the definition of the Fourth Amendment; 
therefore, the Fourth Amendment's protection from govern-
mental intrusion of privacy does not apply to grand jury sub-
poenas.70 The Supreme Court has also refused to issue any 
holding that interferes with a grand jury's effective and expe-
ditious discharge of its duties.71 
However, a grand jury's broad investigative powers are not 
absolute, and a valid claim of privilege may prevent the grand 
jury from obtaining evidence.72 The grand jury has no abso-
lute right to information if a party invokes a valid privilege.73 
Privileges include the right against self-incrimination, the 
attorney-client, clergy-penitent and other recognized statutory 
66. Blair, 250 U.S. at 281. 
67. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1973) (quoting Blair, 250 
U.S. at 281). 
68. Blair, 250 U.S. at 280. 
69. See Frankel, supra note 49, at 20-23. 
70. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (quoting Fraser v. United 
States, 452 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1971)). However, if the subpoena is "far too 
sweeping to be reasonable," it may be invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Hale 
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). But, a subpoena covering twenty-one years was 
upheld despite the fact that an earlier subpoena covering only ten years had kept 
twenty-six men working for two months to produce the records. Frankel, supra 
note 49, at 21 (quoting Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1948)). 
71. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350. Arguments that create litigation prior to the 
grand jury gaining access, including preliminary showings, probably would inter-
fere.ld. 
72. See generally 1 SARA S. BEALE ET AL, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 6:01 (1986) (discussing grand jury's investigative authority and 
right to evidence). 
73. PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7 
(2d ed. 1993). 
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privileges.74 However, a grand jury may have some condition-
al or limited right to the information.75 In addition to a claim 
of privilege, the following subsection demonstrates that a court 
order can also limit the grand jury's broad investigative pow-
ers. 
C. THE COURT'S AUTHORITY REGARDING GRAND JURIES 
Although a grand jury is independent in many ways, it 
formally and technically remains an appendage of the court.76 
Since courts control and supervise subpoenas, a grand jury 
relies completely on an overseeing court for its investigative 
powers.77 Only a court order, not a grand jury, can compel a 
witness to appear and testify.7B Additionally, if a subpoena is 
challenged, a grand jury must obtain a judicial ruling before it 
can exert its force. 79 Courts also limit grand jury investiga-
tions by denying the grand jury subpoenas when it clearly 
exceeds its historic authority or indiscriminately summons 
witnesses with no articulable objective. BO 
Recognizing that indictments are generally not challenged, 
Judge Kennedy wrote "where the prosecutor has the clear 
purpose to enter a privileged area and it is demonstrated that 
there is a high potential for violation of the privilege, a court is 
not required to defer relief until after issuance of the indict-
ment."Bl The holding cited a Supreme Court decision approv-
ing of a protective order that limited the questions the grand 
jury could ask confirming that the judiciary has authority to 
74. Id. 
75. Frankel, supra note 49, at 20 (a witness' Fifth Amendment claim may be 
overcome by a grant of immunity). A privilege under the Right to Financial Priva-
cy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22, will limit the grand jury's use of the information. 
DIAMOND, supra note 73, § 7.07. In cases involving protective orders, the privilege 
has generally been waived, but these examples show the grand jury's power in 
overcoming the policies behind privileges. Id. 
76. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1958). 
77. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 10. 
78. Id. 
79. Frankel, supra note 49, at 20. 
80. BEALE, supra note 72, § 4.01(0) n.69 (citing 1 FGJP at 72 (quoting Hale, 
201 U.S. 43, 63 (1906»). 
81. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
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limit grand jury investigations under some circumstances.82 
The Supreme Court also recognized a district court's authority 
over the grand jury by holding judicial supervision proper to 
prevent a wrong before it occurs if a grand jury seeks to invade 
a valid privilege.83 
III. CIRCUIT COURT CASES REGARDING WHETHER A 
GRAND JURY SUBPOENA PREVAILS OVER A 
CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Janet Greeson's A Place For Us (In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes),84 three circuits, the 
Second,85 Fourth,86 and Eleventh,87 had considered whether 
to allow the government access to sealed civil discovery materi-
al for a criminal investigative purpose. The historic and broad 
powers of the grand jury to obtain all evidence necessary for 
fair indictment, and the purpose of protective orders in facili-
tating the civil system's process, were briefly considered by the 
courtS.88 The Second Circuit found that the interests served 
by protective orders outweigh the public's interest in having 
access to the sealed materia1.89 It established a presumption 
to uphold protective orders unless the government could dem-
onstrate improvidence in the grant of the protective order, 
some extraordinary circumstance, or a compelling need.90 The 
82. Id. (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972». The court issued 
the protective order to protect a Congressional privilege regarding legislative pro-
cess. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 628-29. BEALE, supra note 72, § 4.01(0). 
83. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346. 
84. 62 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995). 
85. Martindell v. IT&T, 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Davis, 
702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); Palmieri v. New 
York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985); Andover Data Services v. Statistical Tabulating 
Corp., 876 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 
945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991). 
86. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
487 U.S. 1240 (1988). 
87. Williams v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1993). 
88. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 864; Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471; Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 
1224; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1014. 
89. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Martindell. 
90. [d. (the rebuttable presumption to uphold a protective order, which places 
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Fourth and Eleventh Circuits rejected the Second Circuit's 
approach by adopting a per se rule that grand jury subpoenas 
automatically prevail over validly issued protective orders.91 
The Ninth Circuit, after a cursory discussion, rejected the 
Second Circuit's balancing approach relying almost exclusively 
on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' opinions to adopt their 
per se rule.92 This section reviews the relevant cases in these 
four circuits. 
A. THE SECOND CIRCmT 
The Second Circuit has addressed more cases regarding 
grand juries subpoenaing sealed civil discovery material than 
any other circuit.93 The five relevant Second Circuit cases are 
presented in chronological order and illustrate three primary 
points. First, the Second Circuit balanced the competing policy 
interests and established a rebuttable presumption to uphold 
protective orders against grand jury subpoenas.94 Second, the 
court developed a test to allow the government to rebut this 
presumption.95 The Second Circuit cases, taken as a whole, 
define this test and demonstrate its application to specific facts 
of a case. Third, these cases demonstrate that the Second Cir-
cuit has considered and dismissed the relevant issues raised 
later by courts adopting a per se rule in place of a balancing 
test.96 
the burden on the government to show improvidence in the grant of the order, a 
compelling need, or an extraordinary circumstance, is referred to as the Martindell 
test.). See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text discussing the presumption. 
91. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477-78; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017, 
1020. 
92. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226-27. See infra notes 253-66 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
93. Compare, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (discussing five relevant Second Circuit cases) with In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1987) (case of first impression) and Williams, 
995 F.2d 1013 (case of first impression). 
94. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96. 
95. Id. at 296. 
96. See Andover, 876 F.2d at 1083-84 (protective orders cannot be "de facto" 
grants of immunity); see also Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865 (rejected Fourth Circuit's 
per se rule). 
15
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1. Establishing a Presumption and a Test to Rebut it: 
Martindell u. IT&T 
In Martindell u. IT&T,97 the Second Circuit became the 
first federal appellate court to address the government's at-
tempt to gain access to sealed civil discovery material for use 
in a criminal investigation.9s The government sought access to 
written discovery material sealed under a protective order 
resulting from a" court approved settlement.99 The government 
requested access to the sealed information by calling and send-
ing a letter to the district judge rather than issuing a grand 
jury subpoena or intervening and moving to modify the or-
der.loo 
In Martindell, the Second Circuit held that the FRCP's 
goal, to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion" of civil disputes, is "the cornerstone of our civil justice 
administration."lol The court also held that protective orders 
serve this goal by encouraging full disclosure of all relevant 
information. l02 If parties could not rely on protective orders 
to keep privileged information from the government, they 
would not waive their privilege and offer this information. l03 
Therefore, protective orders would no longer promote efficien-
cy.l04 The court also recognized the public's interest in per-
mitting law enforcement agencies access to all relevant evi-
dence. lOs In weighing this countervailing factor, the court not-
ed District Court Judge Frankel's prior finding that the gov-
97. 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979). 
98. [d. The charges included perjury and conspiracy. [d. at 293. However, the 
court never reached the issue of whether the government could obtain this infor-
mation for perjury charges since the government, in its reply brief, stated that it 
did not seek the information to prove false statements. [d. at 295. 
99. [d. at 292. 
100. [d. at 293-94. The Second Circuit found that the district court had granted 
informal permission to the government to intervene and that the parties had 
waived any potential objection they may have had to the government's standing. 
[d. at 294. 




105. [d. at 296. 
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ernment has awesome powers that should make exploitation of 
civil litigation unnecessary. lOS 
The Second Circuit concluded that parties' reliance on 
protective orders increases efficiency in civil litigation, and 
therefore, presumptively outweighs the government's need for 
access to discovery produced in private litigation. 107 The court 
held that "absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of a 
Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance 
or compelling need ... a witness should be entitled to rely 
upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third 
party, including the government.'>l08 The court further held 
that protective orders should not be vacated or modified merely 
to accommodate the government, regardless of whether the 
material is sought for evidence or a possible perjury 
charge. 109 
2. Creating an Exception to the Presumption by Defining 
Extraordinary Circumstance: United States v. Davis 
The Second Circuit revisited the situation of a grand jury 
subpoenaing a presumably protected deposition transcript and 
business documents produced during discovery in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.110 The deponent testified on a condition of an 
oral, rather than written, agreement that the information 
would not be made public. 111 The court distinguished the case 
from Martindell because there was no formal written order or 
evidence that the deponent testified only in reliance on a prom-
106. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (citing GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak, 415 F. 
Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). The court noted that the government could convene a 
grand jury, subpoena witnesses, and grant immunity if witnesses claimed their 
Fifth Amendment privileges. [d. at n.6. 
107. [d. at 296. The court expressly stated that it was not deciding whether the 
government would be entitled to enforcement of a subpoena for the discovery ma-
terial. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. The concurrence took an even stricter stance by agreeing with the 
outcome, but rejecting the balancing test. [d. at 297 (Medina J., concurring). The 
concurrence would vacate or modify a protective order only if it was "improperly 
or 'improvidently' granted." [d. 
110. Davis, 702 F.2d at 418, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983). 
111. [d. at 422-23. 
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ise of protection. 112 Also, unlike its informal request in 
Martindell, the government had issued a subpoena for the 
information. 113 
Unlike the deposition in Martindell, the business docu-
ments were protected by a written court order. 114 Neverthe-
less, the Second Circuit permitted the grand jury access to 
these documents for two reasons not present in Martindell. 
First, the protective order stated that either party could dis-
close any of its own information to third parties without violat-
ing the order. 115 Second, the court found that since the docu-
ments existed and were not protected by any valid privilege, 
the grand jury could have subpoenaed the documents prior to 
the litigation. 116 For these reasons, the court held that par-
ties could not keep information from a grand jury by deciding, 
as private litigants, to withhold the material from the pub-
lie. 117 
3. Extension of Test to Grand Jury Subpoenas & Standard for 
Improvidence: Palmieri v. New York 
The Second Circuit subsequently extended the Martindell 
test to situations where the government intervened to modify a 
protective order or issued a grand jury subpoena for protected 
material. 118 In Palmieri v. New York, the magistrate oversee-
112. [d. at 422. 
113. [d. Martindell dealt only with the government's informal request for the 
sealed material, not a grand jury subpoena. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 293-94. 
114. Davis, 702 F.2d at 423. 
115. [d. The party could choose to give information to the grand jury and 
therefore the party, not the protective order, would actually prevent the grand jury 
access. See id. 
116. Davis, 594 F.2d at 423. Davis limited Martindell by only protecting liti-
gants that specifically rely upon a written and validly issued protective order. See 
id. The court also recognized that the scope of protective orders may be limited. 
[d. In addition, only information produced during litigation or which would not 
otherwise have been available to a grand jury is protected. [d. 
117. [d. The court analyzed this case under Martindell, but did not explicitly 
call the factual situations on which they based modification of the orders, an ex-
traordinary circumstance. See id. However, the court found that specific facts in 
this case, which distinguished it from Martindell, warranted modifying the order. 
[d. at 422-23. Hence, the author construes this case as one example implicitly 
defining the term "extraordinary circumstance." 
118. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 863. 
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ing pre-trial discovery in the prior civil action issued the pro-
tective order as part of a settlement agreement and noted that 
the parties had given information in reliance upon the protec-
tive order.l19 The protective order expressly prohibited disclo-
sure of the information to anyone, including the govern-
ment.120 Nevertheless, the government moved to modify the 
protective order to gain access to the information.121 While 
the motion was pending, the government issued a grand jury 
subpoena for the documents. 122 
In its analysis, the Second Circuit conSidered the compet-
ing interests of the grand jury's need to gather evidence for 
criminal investigations and the district court and civil litigants' 
desire to facilitate efficient resolution of disputes through nego-
tiated settlements. 123 Here, the court found that modifying 
the order would inhibit efficient resolution of the civil dis-
pute.124 The parties substantially relied on the protective 
order, and meaningful discovery or settlement would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, without it.125 Conversely, the 
public's interest in permitting the grand jury access to all in-
formation would not be significantly harmed by modifying the 
order, because the information would not have existed but for 
the protective order. 126 Additionally, the court found that the 
government's special investigative powers provide alternative 
methods of obtaining the information, which justifies imposing 
a rebuttable presumption against modification.127 The govern-
119. [d. 
120. [d. The magistrate sent two letters to the Attorney General making clear 
that the protective orders were issued to insulate the information from the govern-
ment. [d. at 864. 
121. [d. The government had already obtained a copy of a deposition transcript 
after it was inadvertently filed unsealed. [d. Nonetheless, the government also 
wanted access to the terms of the settlement agreement, motivating its motion to 
modify the order. [d. 
122. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 863. The district judge enjoined the government from 
enforcing the subpoena until the motion for modifying the order had been decided. 
[d. 
123. [d. at 864. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. The court noted that a person's extensive reliance on the protective 
order renders the government's burden heavier than it might otherwise be and, 
assuming no improvidence in the grant of the order, the court presumes the order 
to be proper. [d. at 864-65. 
126. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865. 
127. [d. at 866. 
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ment can overcome this presumption by showing that no rea-
sonable alternative exists. 128 
The Second Circuit remanded the case for resolution of 
two issues. First, the district court had made insufficient find-
ings to determine whether a compelling need or extraordinary 
circumstance overcame the government's burden.129 The sec-
ond remanded issue was whether the order had been granted 
improvidently.13o The Second Circuit held that "if, at the time 
he issued the sealing orders, the magistrate should have recog-
nized that the settlement would likely further criminal activi-
ty, then he acted improvidently in granting those orders.,,13l 
4. Protective Order is not a "De Facto" Grant of Immunity: 
Andover Data Services v. Statistical Tabulating 
Corporation 
The Second Circuit 'reviewed a case in which a district 
court issued a protective order to compel testimony from a 
witness claiming his Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination.132 The Second Circuit recognized that a protec-
tive order is not equal to a grant of immunity.133 The Second 
Circuit held that witnesses exercising a Fifth Amendment 
right cannot be compelled to testify because civil courts have 
no means to fashion a sufficiently durable safeguard to fully 
protect the witness. 134 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 866. 
130. [d. at 865-66. 
131. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865. The New York State Attorney General had 
previously filed affidavits in state court alleging that earlier settlements with cer-
tain defendants to this civil suit involved "unusual and possibly unlawful circum-
stances." [d. at 863. However, the district court stated that "the magistrate, while 
acting in good faith ... should not have entered sealing orders ... ", Palmieri v. 
DIC Concrete, 81 Civ. 6217 (Tr. May 28, 1985) at 23-24, cited in id. at 865, the 
appellate court held this was not a proper finding of improvidence. Palmieri, 779 
F.2d at 865. Instead, the court held the relevant inquiry was whether the official 
reasonably should have recognized a substantial likelihood that the settlement 
would facilitate or further criminal activity. [d. at 865-66. 
132. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1081. 
133. [d. at 1082-84. 
134. [d. at 1084. 
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The Second Circuit followed the Supreme Court's rule that 
a witness may invoke the right against self-incrimination in 
any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding so long as a 
reasonable basis for asserting the right exists.135 The rule 
further states that district courts may not compel a witness in 
a civil case to testify over a valid assertion of her Fifth Amend-
ment right. 13s Based on this authority, the Second Circuit 
held that only a grant of statutory immunity is sufficiently co-
extensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment to abridge 
the fundamental right against self-incrimination.137 
Since a court can overturn or modify a protective order, 
the Second Circuit found its protection to be more limited than 
a statutory grant of immunity.13B The court also recognized 
that only the Executive Branch has authority to grant a wit-
ness immunity.139 The court concluded that the distinction 
between protective orders and immunity would disappear if 
courts could compel testimony based on protective orders.l40 
A protective order construed in this manner "might very well 
amount to an impermissible 'de facto' grant of immunity," 
which the court would have to reject. 141 
The Second Circuit expressed that this decision did not 
abrogate the Martindell line of cases, and distinguished them 
based on whether the witness had voluntarily consented to 
testify.142 When a witness asserts her right against self-in-
135. [d. at 1082 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972». 
A witness' reasonable belief that his testimony may be used for criminal prosecu-
tion or may lead to evidence that might be so used is a reasonable basis. [d. 
136. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1082 (citing Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 
256-57 (1972)). 
137. [d. at 1083. A grant of immunity displaces a Fifth Amendment privilege 
because it leaves the witness in substantially the same position as if he had never 
testified. [d. (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 458-59 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964»). 
138. [d. (citing Martindell line of cases). 
139. [d. at 1084. 
140. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1084. 
141. [d. The court cited the Fourth Circuit's decision, Grand Jury Subpoena, 
836 F.2d at 1475, to support its finding that protective orders are an impermissi-
ble judicial grant of immunity when they deny access to the government for use 
in a criminal proceeding. [d. However, the Second Circuit declined to follow the 
general application of the Fourth Circuit's rule, holding that the present decision 
did not abrogate the Martindell line of cases. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1084. 
142. [d. 
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crimination and continues to refuse to testify, as in Andover, a 
court must provide equivalent protection before it can compel 
testimony.l43 Therefore, a court's use of a protective order to 
displace a valid privilege and compel a witness' testimony 
could be construed as a "de facto" grant of immunity.l44 How-
ever, where a witness voluntarily consents to testify under a 
protective order, the court is under no obligation to assure 
equivalent protection. 145 
5. Affirming Martindell and Rejecting the Per Se Rule: In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum 
In 1991, the Second Circuit affirmed Martindell and again 
expressly rejected the notion of construing a protective order as 
a "de facto" grant of immunity.146 A district court appointed 
an examiner to investigate allegedly fraudulent pre-Chapter 11 
transactions. 147 The bankrupt corporation refused to produce 
documents voluntarily unless they would be kept confidential 
and used exclusively in the bankruptcy proceeding. l48 The 
bankruptcy judge issued a protective order to expedite the 
investigation. 149 Subsequently, the government issued a 
grand jury subpoena to both the investigator and the corpora-
tion, requesting the sealed depositions taken by the examiner 
during the investigation.150 
Both parties moved to quash the subpoena, but the district 
court, construing the order as an express agreement to with-
143. See id. (protective orders cannot be used to compel testimony when a party 
claims a valid Fifth Amendment right because only immunity offers equivalent 
protection). 
144. See id. (use of a protective order to displace a Fifth Amendment right 
eliminates any meaningful distinction between a protective order and immunity). 
145. See Andover 876 F.2d at 1084 (the court's decision does not abrogate the 
Martindell line of cases, which all involved parties voluntarily consenting to testi-
fy). 
146. Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1221 (citing Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475.). 
147. [d. at 1222. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. The creditors believed that the corporation was a wasting asset. [d. 
The judge approved and signed the order stating "the order was in the best inter-
est of the Debtor's estate and the requirements of justice. . .. " [d. 
150. [d. at 1223. 
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hold information from the government, denied the motions. 151 
On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district 
court's finding that the protective order violated public policy 
by facilitating concealment of information relevant to the com-
mission of a crime.152 Since any order may conceal informa-
tion from the government, the Second Circuit noted that fol-
lowing the district court's ruling might render all protective 
orders void. 153 As a result, the Second Circuit upheld its pre-
vious decision in Andover that protective orders are not grants 
of immunity because, unlike immunity, the Martindell test 
permits a court to modify protective orders. 154 
Additionally, the district court placed the burden on the 
movants to demonstrate why the subpoena should be quashed, 
rather than on the government to show improvidence, com-
pelling need, or an extraordinary circumstance as outlined by 
Second Circuit precedent.155 Since the district court did not 
place the burden on the government and "improperly" con-
strued the order, the appellate court remanded the case to 
allow the district court to apply the Martindell test. 156 
B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT: IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA 
The Fourth Circuit decided only one case regarding wheth-
er a grand jury subpoena should prevail over a protective or-
der.157 The majority stated that the issue involved three in-
terests, but later found one invalid.158 Of the two remaining 
interests, the court accorded great weight to the public's in-
151. Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1223. The district court 
held that the order was contrary to the public policy against agreements that 
conceal information regarding the commission of a crime. Id. 
152. Id. at 1225. The Second Circuit held that Palmieri expressed the appro-
priate test for improvidence. Id. See supra note 131 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the test used to find improvidence. 
153. Id. 
154. Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1224-25. The Second 
Circuit expressly declined to follow the Fourth Circuit's per. se rule favoring grand 
jury subpoenas. Id. at 1225. 
155. Id. at 1224. 
156. Id. at 1225-26. 
157. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988). 
158. Id. at 1471-72. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text discussing 
the three interests. 
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terest in permitting the government access to all information 
involving criminal investigations. 159 The court also discussed 
the importance of protective orders in facilitating civil dis-
putes.160 Rather than developing a test or finding that one 
interest presumptively outweighs the other, the court conclud-
ed that protective orders that shield information from the 
government serve neither interest because they are improper 
"de facto" grants of immunity.161 Therefore, the court ruled 
that a grand jury subpoena should automatically prevail over a 
protective order. 162 To support this "per se" rule, the Fourth 
Circuit held that district courts had other means to substitute 
for protective orders and that a case by case balancing would 
be ineffective.163 The dissent would have followed the Second 
Circuit's balancing test. 164 
1. The Majority - Creation of the Per Se Rule 
The Fourth Circuit's majority affirmed a district court's 
holding that a civil protective order cannot be used to shield 
discovery materials from a grand jury.165 During civil discov-
ery, some deponents had expressed concern about giving testi-
mony because of an ongoing grand jury investigation. 166 They 
moved for a stay of discovery until the grand jury completed its 
investigation to avoid choosing between incriminating them-
159. Id. at 1471, 1474-75. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text dis-
cussing the importance of the grand jury. 
160. Id. at 1472-73. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text discussing 
the importance of protective orders. 
161. Id. at 1475. See infra note 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
court's finding that protective orders are "de facto" grants of immunity. 
162. Id at 1476-77. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text discussing 
court's adoption of the per se rule. 
163. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476-77. See infra notes 183-87 
and accompanying text discussing support for the rule. 
164. [d. at 1478-81 (Sprouse J. dissenting). See infra notes 189-204 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the dissent. 
165. Id. at 1469. When the State of Maryland put Community Savings and 
Loan into conservatorship, its parent corporation filed for bankruptcy. Id. Subse-
quently, several mortgage insurers who insured mortgages held by the parent 
corporation, brought suit against Community, its parent corporation, and others. 
[d. During discovery, some deponents became concerned about giving testimony be-
cause of an ongoing grand jury investigation regarding the collapse of Community 
Savings and Loan. Id. 
166. Id. The investigation concerned the collapse of Community Savings and 
Loan.Id. 
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selves and asserting their Fifth Amendment rights. 167 Instead 
of staying discovery, the parties and the deponents agreed to 
seal the deposition transcripts with a protective order. 168 Sub-
sequently, the grand jury issued subpoenas to the deponents 
and both parties' attorneys, requesting the sealed deposition 
transcripts. 169 
The Fourth Circuit considered three intersecting interests 
to resolve this issue of first impression. The three interests 
were: "[1] the authority of a grand jury to gather evidence in a 
criminal investigation; [2] the deponents' right against self-
incrimination; and [3] the goals of liberal discovery and effi-
cient dispute resolution in civil proceedings.,,17o The Fourth 
Circuit reviewed numerous Supreme Court cases to establish 
that grand juries have broad constitutional and statutory pow-
ers to investigate criminal wrongdoing.171 The Fourth Circuit 
also pointed to numerous cases holding that courts should not 
interfere with grand jury investigations. 172 
The Fourth Circuit found deponents' Fifth Amendment 
rights to be invalid interests because they do "not require, nor 
may it depend on, the shield of civil protective orders.,,173 The 
167. [d. 
168. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1469. The order expressly stated that 
the depositions were "not to be made available to any state or federal investigat-
ing agency or authority ... ," and limited use of the information to the proceed-
ing, but allowed for modification of the order. [d. at 1469-70. 
169. [d. at 1469-70. 
170. [d. at 1471. The district court did not consider the government's argument 
that the protective order was issued improvidently because it was issued to protect 
deponent's Fifth Amendment rights. [d. The appellate court agreed that this issue 
was not necessary to decide this case. [d. at 1471. 
171. [d. (citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280, 282 (1919) (sweeping 
power to compel production of evidence, right to consider all relevant information 
to determine nature of crime and identity of accused); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (creating a right to all evidence because "the public ... has 
a right to every man's evidence"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 
(1974) (gathering evidence is an essential task "unrestrained by the technical pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules .... "». 
172. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471 (citing United States v. United 
States Dist. Ct., 238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom., Valley Bell 
Dairy Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 981 (1957» (investigative function not subject 
to court's direction because of constitutional status»; United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973) (court intervention requires a compelling reason). 
173. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471. 
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deponents waived their Fifth Amendment rights in reliance on 
a protective order, but argued that the burden of silence may 
unduly punish individuals for asserting their Fifth Amendment 
rights. 174 The Fourth Circuit, relying on Supreme Court pre-
cedent, held that the adverse inference a court creates by re-
quiring a party to invoke her Fifth Amendment right is not 
protected by the Fifth Amendment. 175 The court concluded 
that only a party's silence or a grant of immunity could elimi-
nate the risk of waiving a Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 176 
The third interest was the civil courts' need to facilitate 
resolution of private disputes. 177 The court recognized that 
claims of Fifth Amendment privilege can thwart civil litiga-
tion.17s The FRCP authorizes judges to mitigate this problem 
by issuing protective orders which encourage full disclosure 
and promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" 
of civil disputes. 179 However, the court concluded that, since 
protective orders cannot eliminate the risk of the information 
finding its way to the government through leaks, disclosure 
during trial, or modification of the order, deponents cannot and 
will not rely on protective orders in their decisions to waive 
privileges. lso Further, the court found that the judiciary does 
not have authority to weigh the various interests, since a find-
ing against the government would be equivalent to an improp-
er "de facto" grant of immunity.1Sl 
174. [d. at 1472. Silence may bar a party from asserting facts that would allow 
him to prevail and would result in adverse financial consequences. [d. 
175. [d. at 1471-72 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Pillsbury, 
459 U.S. 248). The burden of an adverse interference that the Fifth Amendment 
does not protect is that silence in civil litigation may burden a party by not allow-
ing them to assert possibly incriminating facts that would allow that party to pre-
vail. [d. 
176. [d. at 1471. 
177. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1472-73. 
178. [d. at 1472 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26(c». See generally, Robert Heidt, 
The Conjurer's Circle, 91 YALE L.J. 1062 (May 1982) (discussion of problems and 
alternatives when parties and non-parties invoke their Fifth Amendment right 
during civil proceedings). 
179. [d. See supra notes 18-26, 31-42 and accompanying text discussing the role 
of protective orders. 
180. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1478. The court found that if witnesses 
do not rely on protective orders, they will not waive their privileges, which will 
not further the court's interest in increasing efficiency. See id. 
181. [d. The court found that granting a protective order would be improper be-
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The Fourth Circuit appeared to uphold the district court's 
finding that the grand jury's investigation outweighs and bet-
ter benefits the public than encouraging witnesses to be coop-
erative during civil discovery. 182 The Fourth Circuit ques-
tioned whether protective orders further the fair resolution of 
civil disputes since they may protect deponents from peIjury 
charges.183 Additionally, the court recognized that civil courts 
have tools other than protective orders to facilitate civillitiga-
tion. l84 
After analyzing the relevant interests, the Fourth Circuit 
held that grand jury subpoenas are enforceable despite the 
presence of protective orders. 185 The court rejected the Second 
Circuit's case-by-case balancing approach, noting that, since 
government officials are not present to state their interest 
when an order is entered, a court could rarely balance compet-
ing interests effectively at that time. 18s Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit found that courts' routine grants of protective 
orders did not promote "effective balancing."187 Therefore, by 
declining to find valid interests to weigh against the need for 
grand jury inv~stigations, the Fourth Circuit adopted a per se 
rule that grand jury subpoenas automatically prevail over 
otherwise valid protective orders. 188 
cause only the Executive Branch of government, which has exclusive authority to 
grant immunity, can conduct a balancing of these interests. [d. 
182. [d. at 1474. See also supra notes 301-23 and accompanying text for a 
discussion and critique of protective orders construed as immunity. 
183. [d. at 1475-76. The mere existence of a protective order would make it 
more difficult for the government to know whether a person may have committed 
perjury. [d. 
184. [d. at 1476. The additional tools include judicial authority to grant a stay 
in the civil discovery until the criminal investigation is completed, shifting the 
burden in the case to the party claiming the privilege, or excluding evidence from 
the case that had been previously claimed as privileged. [d. at 1476-77; see gener-
ally Heidt, supra note 178, at 1062 (discussion of problems and alternatives when 
parties and non-parties invoke their Fifth Amendment right during civil proceed-
ings). 
185. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477. 
186. [d. at 1477-78. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. at 1478. 
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2. The Dissent - Rejection of the Per Se Rule 
The dissent in the Fourth Circuit case rejected the 
majority's balancing of abstract interests and adoption of a per 
se rule. 1s9 The dissent identified only two relevant interests; 
the government's interest in collecting information for ongoing 
criminal investigations and the civil process' interest in effi-
cient resolution of private disputes. 190 
The dissent agreed generally with the Second Circuit's 
balancing approach. 191 It found that refusing to modify a pro-
tective order would barely affect the public's interest in pro-
moting government access to information. 192 The Fourth 
Circuit's dissent noted that by modifying the order spawning 
the deposition, the majority gave the government access to 
evidence that would not have been available without a grant of 
immunity. 193 The dissent also recognized the grand jury's 
"awesome" investigative power, but found it to be an additional 
reason to uphold the protective order. 194 With this analysis, 
the dissent rejected the majority's finding that protective or-
ders impede criminal investigations. 195 
The Fourth Circuit's dissent found the interest served by 
protective orders significant.196 Conversely, the majority held 
that protective orders were of little value since confidentiality 
could be breached by possible leaks or the information becom-
ing public at trial. 197 The dissent found that these factors 
formed valid tactical concerns for parties considering using a 
protective order.19s The dissent further explained that, be-
189. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1479 (Sprouse J., dissenting). 
190. [d. 
191. [d. at 1479-80. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1479. The dissent agreed with a Sev-
enth Circuit finding that "the explicit grant of such extensive investigative power 
should be construed to preclude the implication of supplemental powers, absent 
unusual circumstances." [d. (quoting Wilk v. Am. Medical Assoc., 635 F.2d 1295 
(7th Cir. 1980». 
195. [d. at 1480. 
196. [d. at 1479 
197. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476. 
198. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1481 (Sprouse J., dissenting). The ma-
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cause no separation of powers problem existed, a protective 
order was not a "de facto" grant of immunity.199 It found that, 
unlike immunity, a protective order does not alter a deponent's 
potential culpability, usurp powers of the grand jury, or affect 
the continued conduct of the grand jury investigation.20o In-
stead, the dissent found that protective orders reflect the trial 
judge's authority to manage discovery.201 
After finding that the public's interest in permitting the 
government access to sealed discovery material did not out-
weigh the interests served by protective orders, the dissent 
held that a protective order should not be issued if the presid-
ing judge knows that the grand jury may desire to review the 
sealed materia1.202 The dissent also noted that peIjury would 
be an obvious justification to modify a protective order.203 Fi-
nally, the dissent rejected the majority's argument that alter-
native pre-trial management tools are adequate substitutes for 
protective orders. Instead, the dissenting judge found that 
these alternative tools could not replace protective orders in 
facilitating resolution of civil disputes.204 
C. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT - ADOPTION OF THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT'S PER SE RULE: WILLIAMS V. UNITED STATES 
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit, addressed 
only one case regarding whether a grand jury subpoena should 
prevail over a protective order.205 Weighing the competing in-
terests, the court held that the interest in fostering grand jury 
investigations outweighs the interest in the efficient disposi-
jority found that parties cannot and will not rely on protective orders because 
sealed discovery becomes public at trial. Id. at 1476. The dissent responded that 
litigants may decide that the wide-ranging, successful discovery that protective 
orders promote will forestall or eliminate the public trial. Id. at 1481. 
199. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480 (Sprouse J., dissenting). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984». 
202. Id. This appears similar to the Second Circuit's standard for finding im-
providence. Compare, id. with Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66. 
203. Id. 
204. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480. See also supra note 184 and 
accompanying text for the Fourth Circuit's discussion of alternative tools. 
205. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1014 (case presented issue of first impression). 
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tion of civil cases.206 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit adopted 
the Fourth Circuit's per se rule. 207 The court concluded that 
the Second Circuit had misunderstood the importance of the 
grand jury's role.208 Like the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that courts lack the authority to grant protective 
orders that act as "de facto" grants of immunity.209 
The Eleventh Circuit, reversing a district court's order 
quashing a grand jury subpoena, held that "the essential and 
historic purpose of the grand jury" outweighs the utility of 
protective orders.210 To establish the strong public interest in 
permitting the grand jury access to all information, the Elev-
enth Circuit cited a Supreme Court holding that grand juries 
have sweeping powers to investigate criminal activity.2l1 The 
Eleventh Circuit also found that, since the grand jury, on be-
half of the public, has a right to all evidence212 and every per-
son has a duty to comply with a grand jury subpoena,213 
courts must compel those subpoenaed to appear and testi-
fy.214 The Eleventh Circuit also noted that a grand jury can-
206. Id. at 1017. 
207. Id. at 1020. 
208. Id. at 1017. 
209. Id. at 1017-20. 
210. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015, 1020. The settled civil action involved an in-
surance salesman's suit against his employer to collect allegedly unpaid commis-
sion. Id. at 1013. The employer claimed the commission had been rebated by the 
salesman to the customer, an illegal practice under state law. Id. During this liti-
gation, the government was investigating whether the salesman's actions were 
criminal. Id. at 1013-14. Out of fear that his testimony might incriminate him, the 
salesman moved for a protective order, which the court granted. Id. at 1014. Soon 
after the salesman gave his testimony, the suit was settled, but the protective 
order remained in force. Id. Nevertheless, the grand jury subpoenaed a court 
reporter's notes regarding the sealed testimony. Id. The deponent from the civil 
case intervened to move the court to quash the subpoena. Id. The district court 
quashed the subpoena, relying on the Second Circuit and rejecting the Fourth 
Circuit's per se rule. Id. at 1015. However, the district judge did none of the anal-
ysis required by Martindell's three prong test. Id. The government appealed. Id. at 
1015 n.5. 
211. Id. at 1015-16 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974); Blair v. United States, 250 
U.S. 273, 279-80 (1919); United States v. Mandl.\iano, 425 U.S. 564, 573 (1976». 
The grand jury requires wide latitude to investigate criminal activity to effectively 
carry out its role of protecting citizens from unsupported indictments by ensuring 
that it issues accurate indictments and dismisses baseless charges. Id. 
212. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-87). 
213. Id. (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 345). 
214. Id. 
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not complete its investigation and determine whether a crime· 
has been committed until all evidence is collected.215 Based 
on these findings, the Eleventh Circuit accorded significant 
weight to the public'S interest in facilitating grand jury investi-
gations.216 
The Eleventh Circuit placed much less significance on the 
countervailing interests served by protective orders, holding 
that they were merely facilitation devices that "should not be 
used to shield relevant information from a valid grand jury 
subpoena."217 Further, the court found nothing in Rule 26(c) 
or its advisory committee notes to suggest any legislative in-
tent to circumscribe the grand jury's subpoena power.218 The 
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit that an inves-
tigative grand jury need not heed a district court's direc-
tion.219 Also like the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit not-
ed the alternatives available as "substitutes" for protective or-
ders.22o The court concluded that enforcing protective orders 
against grand jury subpoenas disrupts the grand jury pro-
cess.221 In addition, the court found that the efficiency gained 
by the civil process did not outweigh the interest in facilitating 
grand jury investigations.222 
The Eleventh Circuit found that deponents requesting 
protective orders expect guaranteed confidentiality.223 The 
court found that courts could not satisfy this expectation for 
two reasons. First, neither courts, parties nor deponents know 
in advance whether a court will modify an order or whether 
the government might obtain the information in another man-
ner.224 Second, the Eleventh Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit, 
found that this protection would require a grant of immunity 
215. [d. 
216. See id. at 1015-16, 1020. 
217. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017. 
218. [d. 
219. [d. (quoting Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471). 
220. [d. at 1017-18; see supra note 184 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of alternatives the court suggested. 
221. [d. at 1017-18. 
222. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18. 
223. [d. at 1017. 
224. [d. at 1019. 
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which the judicial branch lacks authority to provide.225 The 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court had issued 
the protective order with a guarantee of confidentiality; there-
fore, it was an improper "de facto" grant of immunity.226 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Martindell test as ad-
ministratively unworkable.227 The court found that the Sec-
ond Circuit had not defined "improvident grant," "compelling 
need," "extraordinary circumstance," or how a prosecutor might 
satisfy the burden under Martindell. 228 The court also found 
Martindell administratively unworkable due to the potential 
for conflicts if one judge issued an order and another decided 
to quash the related subpoena.229 Additionally, because depo-
nents cannot know in advance whether an order will be modi-
fied, the court found that a post facto balancing of the interests 
presents a judge with a "Hobson's choice."23o This problem 
arises when a judge must consider whether to modify the order 
after having "induced the witness to incriminate himself by 
promising to enforce the protective order.,,231 
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Second 
Circuit misunderstood the importance of the grand jury's role 
and rejected Martindell's balancing test as administratively 
225. Id. at 1017-18. 
226. [d. 
227. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1018. 
228. [d. at 1018-19. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that to find improvidence, 
only the evidence at the time the order was granted could be used, which makes 
a finding of improvidence unlikely. Id. Otherwise, the court concluded, if a judge 
considered information available after the order was granted, the improvidence test 
would collapse into the compelling need or extraordinary circumstance parts of the 
test. [d. at 1019. The court did not recognize the Second Circuit's decision in 
Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66, that established a test for improvidence. The Elev-
enth Circuit's concern in defining how the prosecutor is to meet her burden is to 
ensure that the prosecutor does not have to expose so much about her investiga-
tion that the policy behind grand jury secrecy is defeated. Id. at 1019. 
229. [d. at 1020. According to the Eleventh Circuit, inter-judge conflict occurs 
when a judge modifies a protective order, because the judge that issued the origi-
nal protective order may threaten contempt if documents are produced to comply 
with a modified order, while the judge that modified the order also threatens con-
tempt if the documents are not produced. Id. 
230. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1019-20. The "Hobson's choice" that the judge sup-
posedly faces is between going back on his word or denying the public its right to 
every man's evidence. Id. 
231. Id. 
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unworkable.232 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the competing 
interests and determined that protective orders cannot shield 
information from grand juries.233 The court held that by 
granting protective orders to deponents who expect absolute 
protection from the government, courts improperly grant them 
"de facto" immunity.234 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit 
adopted the Fourth Circuit's per se rule.235 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
1. Facts & Procedural History: United States v. Janet 
Greeson's A Place For Us (In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Served on Meserve) 
In United States v. Janet Greeson's APFU, the Ninth Cir-
cuit decided an issue of first impression in that circuit by 
adopting the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' per se rule. 236 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
"convincingly explained that a grand jury subpoena should, as 
a matter of course, prevail over a protective order. "237 In 
adopting this per se rule, the Ninth Circuit did not do any 
original analysis or consider the specific facts of the case.238 
Instead, the court relied on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' 
abstract discussion of the issue to adopt a per se rule. 239 
This Ninth Circuit case involved a chain of weight loss 
clinics operated through hospital psychiatric unitS.240 The 
232. [d. at 1020. 
233. [d. 
234. [d. at 1017-18. 
235. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015 (per se rule pennits grand jury subpoenas 
to automatically prevail over protective orders). 
236. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1223, 1226-27. 
237. [d. at 1226. 
238. See id. at 1223-27 (the Ninth Circuit based its entire discussion on the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' cases). See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying 
text discussing Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
239. See id. at 1224-27 (the Ninth Circuit based its holding on the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits' discussion). See also infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits' opinions. 
240. Thomas Mulligan, Diet Clinic Tactics Draw Fire, Los ANGELES TIMES, 
April 10, 1994, at AI, A24; see also Jeff Testerman, More Cash than Pounds Lost 
at Centers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, November 15, 1993, at A7. 
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clinics typically diagnosed patients with psychiatric disorders, 
such as major depression, psychotic depression or bulimia.241 
By providing weight-loss services in psychiatric units and diag-
nosing clients with psychiatric disorders, APFU could bill the 
patients' insurance for "psychiatric" care.242 
Beginning in 1991, insurance companies investigated 
claims submitted by APFU,243 determined they were fraudu-
lent, and refused payment.244 In 1992, the insurance compa-
nies filed suit in federal court alleging that APFU had fraudu-
lently billed them in excess of one hundred million dollars. 245 
The parties reached an oral pre-trial settlement agreement in 
1994.246 Although a court had granted both parties protective 
orders during discovery, the district court, as a material part of 
the settlement agreement, issued a much more restrictive 
protective order sealing all discovery.247 
241. Mulligan, supra note 240, at A24. 
242. Id. at AI, A24. According to APFU employees, APFU staff members fal-
sified medical records to support these allegedly fraudulent insurance claims for 
psychiatric care. Id. at A24. Most insurance companies cover psychiatric disorders, 
but not weight-loss treatment. Thus, APFU allegedly had to masquerade as a 
facility treating psychiatric disorders so that patients' insurance would cover the 
treatment. Id. 
243. Id. Blue Cross' investigation began after receiving an unsigned letter dis-
cussing a meeting where the clinic's psychiatrist instructed staff members on how 
to falsify medical records. Id. The letter also alleged that staff members were cau-
tioned against documenting patient improvement to enable APFU to justify cover-
age for the four week maximum most insurance policies cover for inpatient care. 
Id. 
244. Id. at A24. 
245. Empire Blue Cross v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, 62 F.3d 1218 (9th 
Cir. 1995). Although APFU billed the insurance companies for psychiatric care, the 
insurance companies' allegation was that APFU rendered weight-loss services, not 
psychiatric care. Mulligan, supra note 240, at AI. 
246. Empire Blue Cross, 62 F.3d at 1219. 
247. Id. at 1218-19. Paragraphs one and two of the protective order read as 
follows: 
1. All discovery produced to date and any evidence ob-
tained directly or indirectly by any party during the prep-
aration or course of this litigation, including but not limit-
ed to documents, flIes, records, exhibits, deposition tran-
scripts, video tapes, statements, and exhibits thereto, shall 
be kept confidential, shall not be disclosed to any non-
party and shall be protected from any evidentiary or non-
evidentiary use. Any disclosure prior to the fIling of this 
order shall not be deemed to be in violation of this order 
by any party. 
2. All pleadings flIed or served in this case, including 
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Subsequently, the United States Attorney's Office served 
one of the plaintiff's attorneys from the prior civil action with a 
grand jury subpoena requesting copies of all discovery materi-
a1.248 In response, the attorneys filed a motion in district 
court to quash the grand jury subpoena.249 The defendant in 
the prior civil action, the weight-loss clinic, subsequently filed 
a motion to intervene, and moved to quash the grand jury sub-
poena.250 The district court granted the motion to intervene, 
but denied both parties' motions to quash.251 The weight-loss 
clinic appealed the district court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.252 
2. The Ninth Circuit's Adoption of the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits' Opinions In Lieu of Original Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the three circuits' holdings 
previously addressing whether a grand jury subpoena should 
prevail over a protective order.253 In its opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed Martindell, but declined to discuss the Second 
Circuit's four other cases construing Martindell. 254 Next, the 
Ninth Circuit reviewed the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' "bal-
ancing" of the public's interest in permitting grand jury access 
to all information against the civil process' interest in facilitat-
ing dispute resolution.255 The Ninth Circuit also reviewed the 
exhibits thereto, shall be kept confidential, shall not be 
disclosed to any non-party from this date forward and 
shall be protected from any evidentiary or non-evidentiary 
use. 
Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Janet Greeson's APFU (No. 94-56125). 
248. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1223. 
249. Id. at 1223. 
250. Id. 
251. Appellants' Opening Brief at 3, Janet Greeson's APFU (No. 94-56125). 
252. See Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1222. 
253. Id. at 1223-26. 
254. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1223-24. The Ninth Circuit noted two 
other cases that reaffirmed Martindell, but declined to mention any of the other 
Second Circuit cases or discuss how the two cases that the Ninth Circuit did cite 
expanded upon Martindell. Id. (citing Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 
1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991)); 
see also supra notes 98-156 and accompanying text discussing Second Circuit cas-
es. 
255. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1224-26 (citing Williams v. United 
States, 995 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 
(4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988)). 
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Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' reasons for rejecting the 
Martindell test. 256 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits that facilitating grand jury investigations is a signifi-
cant interest.257 The Ninth Circuit also cited Supreme Court 
precedent supporting the grand jury's independent role and the 
judiciary's limited supervisory power to prescribe grand jury 
procedure.258 The court relied on the Fourth Circuit's finding 
that enforcing protective orders does not facilitate the reso-
lution of civil disputes, since parties will not use protective 
orders if courts do not guarantee their enforcement.259 The 
Ninth Circuit also agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that Con-
gress, by enacting FRCP 26(c), did not intend "to abrogate the 
historical investigative powers of the grand jury.,,260 The 
Ninth Circuit independently held that neither the language 
nor commentary of FRCP 26 supported a Congressional intent 
to extend to the judiciary the executive's exclusive power to 
grant immunity.261 
Having relied on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits to find 
that protective orders cannot shield information from a grand 
jury, the Ninth Circuit rejected Martindell's case-by-case bal-
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 1224-27 (citing Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475 (grand jury 
has a right to all evidence and protective orders that impede the grand jury pro-
cess are invalid); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015-16 (discussing grand jury's important 
historical and independent role and courts limited authority over it)). See also 
supra notes 170-72, 211-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuits' analyses regarding the interest that the grand jury serves 
and its significance. 
258. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226 (citing United States v. Williams, 
504 U.S. 36, 47-50 (1992)). 
259. Id. at 1224-26 (citing Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475). Three 
reasons a court cannot guarantee that a protective order will be enforced are that 
a court may modify the order, the information may become public if the case goes 
to trial, or someone may leak the information. Id. at 1225. See also supra notes 
180-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's finding that 
protective orders cannot facilitate resolution of civil disputes. 
260. Id. at 1225. See supra note 218 and accompanying text discussing the 
Eleventh Circuit's finding of no congressional intent. 
261. Id. at 1226-27 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002, 6003; Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 261). 
The court continued by stating that "such a significant shift in the allocation of 
traditional powers presumably would have been stated explicitly." Id. 
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ancing approach in favor of a per se rule.262 The Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' "discussion of 
the factors weighing on both sides, [which] convincingly ex-
plain that a grand jury subpoena should, as a matter of course, 
prevail over a protective order."263 However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit declined to enumerate the "factors" that the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuit discussed in its holding.264 Instead, the 
court only discussed "factors" in its review of the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits' cases.265 Therefore, the author assumes 
that the Ninth Circuit adopted the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits' opinions in their entirety.266 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE PER SE RULE 
Since the Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuits' opinions to develop its opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion is critiqued through its adoption of 
these circuits' arguments. This critique contains two sections. 
The first reviews and critiques the circuits' findings and analy-
ses of the competing interests. The Second Circuit resulted in a 
rebuttable presumption to uphold protective orders.267 The 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, and therefore the Ninth Circuit, 
evaluated the competing interests to find that protective orders 
should not shield information from grand juries.26B They 
262. Id. at 1226. 
263. Id. 
264. See id. 
265. Id. at 1224-26 (Ninth Circuit's review of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit's 
cases). 
266. Compare, Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1224-26 with Williams, 995 
F.2d 1013 and Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
all the arguments made by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits). The Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits' arguments included finding that a protective order was a "de 
facto" grant of immunity. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1224, 1226 (citing 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18). The 
Ninth Circuit also reviewed both circuits' arguments that Martindell's case-by-case 
balancing was unworkable. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1225, 1226 (citing 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477-78; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-20). The 
Ninth Circuit also reviewed, but did not enumerate, that district judges' pre-trial 
management tools are adequate substitutes for protective orders. Janet Greeson's 
APFU, 62 F.3d at 1225 (citing Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476-77); see 
also supra note 184 and accompanying notes for a discussion of the Fourth 
Circuit's findings regarding alternative pre-trial management tools. 
267. See, e.g., Martindell v. IT&T, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979). 
268. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1477 (4th Cir. 1988); Williams 
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found reasons why a rebuttable presumption should be rejected 
in favor of a per se rule.269 This section concludes that the 
Second Circuit's presumption should prevail when courts prop-
erly weigh the interests. The second section compares 
Martindell's balancing approach with the per se rule. It demon-
strates that Martindell should be adopted over a per se rule. 
A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S PRESUMPTION SHOULD PREVAIL 
WHEN THE INTERESTS ARE PROPERLY WEIGHED 
1. The Second Circuit's Initial Balancing of the Competing 
Interests: Finding a Presumption 
The Second Circuit found that protective orders further 
the purpose of the FRCP by encouraging full disclosure.270 If 
parties can not rely on protective orders to keep information 
from the government, parties will not waive their privileg-
es.271 In that instance, protective orders would not promote 
the FRCP's goal of "just, speedy and inexpensive" resolution of 
private disputes. 272 To tie the FRCP's goals to the issue in 
Martindell, the Second Circuit narrowly characterized the 
interest to be weighed against the grand jury's need for infor-
mation as the party's reliance on the protective order.273 With 
this action, the Second Circuit recognized a policy interest in 
using protective orders to facilitate resolution of civil disputes, 
but ignored a second interest of protecting individual and soci-
etal rights and privileges against discovery abuse.274 N ever-
v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1993). 
269. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477-78 (courts have alternative tools 
available and protective orders that shield information from the government are 
improper "de facto" grants of immunity); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-20 (Martindell 
is administratively unworkable, may lead to inter-judge conflict, and protective 
orders cannot act as "de facto" grants of immunity). 
270. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295; See also supra notes 102-104 and accompany-
ing text. 
271. [d. 
272. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295 (quoting FED. R. ClY. P. 1). 
273. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96; Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864 
(2d Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 101-07, 123-27 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of interests the Second Circuit considered. 
274. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 864. See also 8 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2036 (1994) (purpose of protective orders is to protect against liberal discovery); 
Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 
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theless, by finding that facilitating civil disputes is "the corner-
stone of our civil justice administration," the court afforded 
significant weight to upholding protective orders.275 
The Second Circuit also recognized the government's inter-
est in obtaining information for criminal prosecution, but ac-
corded the interest less weight when the information sought 
was produced during civil litigation.276 The court found that 
the government's awesome investigative powers provide it 
alternative methods to obtain the information, which makes 
exploitation of civil disputes unnecessary.277 Additionally, the 
court recognized that the sealed information sought by the 
government would not exist but for the protective order.278 
Since the Second Circuit found a strong interest in upholding 
protective orders and found no strong countervailing govern-
mental interest, it held that the facilitation of civil disputes 
presumptively outweighs the grand jury's need for information 
produced during private litigation.279 
105 lIARv. L. REV. 427, 441 (1991) (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 
U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (protective orders guard against liberal discovery abuse); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 1 (protective orders are authorized under Rule 26(c), which is subject to 
Rule 1). See also supra notes 10-42 and accompanying text discussing the role of 
protective orders. 
275. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295; see also supra note 101-107 and accompanying 
text discussing Martindell's evaluation of the competing interests. 
276. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; see also supra note 101-107 and accompany-
ing text. 
277. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866; see also supra note 
106, 127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' finding that the 
government has "awesome" powers. 
278. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text 
discussing this court's finding. 
279. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96. See also Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 864-66; 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d 1222, 1226 (2d Cir. 1991). 
See also supra notes 108, 127-29, 155-56 and accompanying text discussing the 
Second Circuit's findings that the government has the burden of rebutting the 
presumption. 
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2. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' Initial Balancing of the 
Competing Interests 
a. Facilitating Resolution of Civil Disputes is an Insufficient 
Interest on Which to Base a Protective Order 
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits considered the 
need for protective orders to facilitate resolution of civil dis-
putes and the grand jury's need for access to information.280 
Both circuits found that grand juries have broad investigative 
powers with which the courts should not interfere.281 Howev-
er, neither circuit discussed limitations of any judicial authori-
ty over a grand jury's power.282 
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, like the Second Circuit, 
defined the countervailing interest narrowly as the facilitation 
of private litigation.283 Like the Second Circuit, neither the 
Fourth Circuit nor the Eleventh Circuit recognized the addi-
tional policy interest in having protective orders protect indi-
vidual and societal rights and privileges.2M This narrow char-
acterization of the interests did not create a problem for the 
Second Circuit.285 It found facilitating dispute resolution 
more significant than the grand jury's need for access to infor-
mation.286 The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, however, char-
280. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1471 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015. The Fourth Circuit men-
tioned the witness' right against self-incrimination as an interest to be considered, 
but concluded that no interest existed, leaving the Fourth Circuit weighing the 
same interests as the Eleventh Circuit had. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 
1471. See also supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text for Fourth Circuit's 
finding that no valid interest existed. 
281. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-17; Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471; 
see also supra notes 171-72, 211-15, 219 and accompanying text discussing the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' findings regarding the grand jury's power. 
282. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468; see also Williams, 995 F.2d 
1013. See also supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of limita-
tions on the grand jury and the court's authority over it. 
283. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1472-73; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016. 
284. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1472-74; see also Williams, 995 
F.2d at 1016-17; see also supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text discussing 
protective orders as a safeguard against discovery abuse. 
285. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66. 
286. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; Palmieri, 779 F.~d at 865-66; see also supra 
notes 103-06, 125-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second 
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acterized protective orders as mere facilitating devices and 
found them insufficient to outweigh the grand jury's interest in 
obtaining access to information.287 Had these courts consid-
ered the restraints on the grand jury and the role of protective 
orders as a safeguard against liberal discovery, the courts' bal-
ancing of the competing interests may have been altered. 
The Eleventh Circuit found no congressional intent to 
impinge on the grand jury's subpoena power.288 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed, adding that if Congress had intended this re-
sult, it would have been explicitly stated.289 The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that many people will not agree to testify under a 
protective order because their protection is less than abso-
lute.29o Therefore, protective orders cannot effectively facili-
tate the resolution of civil disputes unless parties are justified 
in relying on their protection.291 
The policy of protecting parties from abuses of liberal 
discovery does not suggest that protective orders are merely 
facilitating devices.292 The courts did not discuss the history 
and policy of protective orders, and ignored the integral role 
protective orders play in the administration of civil disputes 
under the FRCP.293 As for a lack of Congressional intent, nei-
ther the Eleventh Circuit nor the Ninth Circuits recognized 
that it would have been easier for Congress to adopt a per se 
Circuit's findings that reduced the weight it accorded to the grand jury's need to 
obtain access to sealed discovery material. 
287. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475-76; see also Williams, 995 
F.2d at 1017. See also supra notes 170-88, 211-226 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' findings. 
288. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18; see also supra note 218 and accompanying 
text discussing the Eleventh Circuit's finding. 
289. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226-27. 
290. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475-76. The Fourth Circuit held that 
parties would not rely on protective orders, because the information might be 
leaked to the government, and the order may be modified or become public at 
trial. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-18 (considering only the interest of facil-
itating civil disputes); 8 Wright & MILLER § 2036 (role of protective orders); Mill-
er, supra note 274, at 441, 447; See also supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text 
discussing the role of protective orders. 
293. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475-76; see also Williams, 995 
F.2d at 1017-18. See also supra notes 13-42 discussing the interests protective or-
ders serve. 
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rule than to create a test.294 The problem inherent in creating 
a single test to apply to the many variables of such an abstract 
rule is precisely why Congress delegated to the courts the 
discretion to issue and uphold protective orders.295 Before 
finding that protective orders serve an insufficient interest, 
courts should consider all the relevant interests and reconsider 
Congressional intent regarding Rule 26(c). 
The Fourth Circuit's finding, that litigants will not rely on 
protective orders because they are subject to modification, 
ignores that litigants have testified under protective orders 
with full knowledge of their imperfect protection.296 The 
court's finding ignores parties who need to protect information 
but are not aware that the government would want it. If the 
government clearly can overcome a protective order without 
showing any need, parties will be reluctant to waive their 
privileges.297 The court also ignores parties willing to weigh 
whether the government will be able to meet its Martindell 
burden to get the information.298 A per se rule, however, not 
only assures parties that if the government wants the informa-
tion it will get it, but that the government will be more likely 
to seek information knowing it is available.299 Therefore, par-
ties concerned about the dissemination of their information 
will be less likely to disclose it once they become aware of the 
per se rule.30o 
294. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226-27; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1018; see 
also 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2036 (need for trial courts to have discretion). See 
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text discussing the difficulty in formulating a 
rule and the decision to permit judges' to use their discretion to decide each case. 
295. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2036 (the trial courts were given discretion because 
of the many variables involved in each specific case); see also supra notes 21-23 
and accompanying text for a discussion of why discretion was delegated to the 
courts. 
296. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1478; See, e.g., Martindell, 594 F.2d at 
296 (Second Circuit cases gave notice that protective orders may be modified or 
vacated). 
297. Marlindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96. 
298. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1481 (Sprouse J. dissenting) (the 
decision to seek a protective order is a tactical one that should be left to the 
parties). 
299. Id. at 1477, 1479; see also Williams, 995 F.2d at 1015, 1017 (a court will 
not balance competing interests under the per se rule). 
300. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1479 (Sprouse J. dissenting). 
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b. Protective Orders Serve No Valid Interest Because They are 
Improper "De Facto" Grants of Immunity 
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits diminished the balanc-
ing of competing interests by holding that using protective 
orders to facilitate the resolution of civil disputes would im-
properly create a judicial "de facto" grant of immunity.301 The 
courts held that protective orders cannot outweigh the signif-
icant interest accorded to facilitating grand jury investiga-
tions.302 Since protective orders serve no policy interests, the 
courts adopted the per se rule that the grand jury's need for 
information automatically prevails over a protective order.303 
To reach this conclusion, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
made two preliminary findings. First, the courts found that a 
person waiving a right or privilege in return for a protective 
order expects absolute protection which only a grant of immu-
nity can provide.3M The courts made a leap in logic to find 
that the party's expectation required the court to provide a "de 
facto" grant of immunity.305 The courts then found a judicial 
"de facto" grant of immunity to be invalid, since only the Exec-
utive branch of government has authority to grant immuni-
ty.30G The Fourth Circuit concluded that protective orders 
cannot facilitate resolution of civil disputes because no one 
would waive their privilege without an absolute guarantee of 
301. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475, 1478; Williams, 995 F.2d at 
1017-18. The Eleventh Circuit made a separate finding that protective orders 
might facilitate civil disputes, but held that this was not a compelling reason to 
shield information from a grand jury. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18. However, 
this finding only considered the interest of facilitating civil disputes and not the 
interest of protecting rights and privileges. See id. (the court considered only the 
first interest, not the second); see also supra notes 13-30 and accompanying notes 
discussing the interest of protective orders in protecting rights and privileges. 
302. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-17; Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 
1471, 1478 (protective orders that are "de facto" grants of immunity are not valid). 
303. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-18; see also Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 
F.2d at 1471-73, 1475, 1478. 
304. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18; Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477-78. 
305. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1478; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18. 
306. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6003 and Supreme Court 
cases); Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475 (citing Supreme Court cases and 
discussing separation of power problem). 
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confidentiality.307 Since courts cannot grant immunity, which 
is the only form of absolute protection, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that no interest exists to balance against allowing the 
grand jury access to all information.308 Therefore, the Elev-
enth Circuit held protective orders that shield information 
from the government to be automatically invalid as improper 
"de facto" grants of immunity.309 
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' analyses and conclu-
sions are flawed. First, the leap in logic from a party expecting 
an absolute guarantee of confidentiality to finding that a court 
actually provided the guarantee rejects the idea that although 
a protective order might not be equal to the protection of the 
waived right, a party may voluntarily accept less than com-
plete protection as sufficient consideration.310 This is entirely 
different than a court not being able to compel a witness to 
waive a right or privilege, which would require complete pro-
tection.3u However, since the issue is whether a party can 
307. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475-76, 1478. 
308. See id. at 1478 (only a grant of immunity would induce a party to forsake 
a privilege. Also, courts do not have authority to balance the competing interests.). 
309. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18. 
310. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475 (deponents seek "de facto" grant 
of immunity); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017 ("federal courts lack the power to pro-
vide witnesses with the broad protection that witnesses seek."). No circumstance 
exists where protective orders offer the same protection as a waived privilege. If 
the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' lines of reasoning prevailed all protective orders 
would be invalid. Andover Data Services v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 
1080, 1084 (2d Cir. 1989); Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1225. 
For example, any valid tight to privacy, attorney-client, physician, or spousal privi-
lege is absolute against a third party. However, once a party waives the privilege 
and the information is protected only by a protective order, the order can be modi-
fied and the information released based on a compelling need. The compelling 
need would not have invalidated the original privilege. Previous cases gave notice 
that a protective order could be modified or vacated. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 
836 F.2d 1468 (notice that at least one court would automatically allow the gov-
ernment access to sealed information through per se rule). The Second Circuit also 
clarified that a protective order may be modified by showing improvidence in the 
grant of the order, a compelling need or extraordinary circumstance. See, e.g., 
Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (protective orders have 
independent authority to protect information. This power is not derived from the 
right or privilege that the party or deponent waives.). Both the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits have held that protective orders do not offer protection equivalent to 
a party's right or privilege. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1018; Grand Jury Subpoena, 
836 F.2d at 1475. See supra notes 138-45, 199-201 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the distinction between protective orders and immunity. 
311. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1082-83 (a completely different issue exists depending 
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rely on a protective order while voluntarily waiving a right or 
privelege, and not whether a court could compel discovery, 
courts should not consider whether the order gives sufficient 
protection.312 Rather than eliminating the interest based on 
insufficient protection, the circuits should have analyzed and 
balanced the policies establishing protective orders and grand 
juries.313 Finding protective orders that shield information 
from the government equal to grants of immunity simply al-
lows the courts to avoid weighing the competing policy 
interests.314 
Neither the Fourth or Eleventh Circuit recognized that the 
Second Circuit had already addressed a protective order as a 
"de facto" grant of immunity.315 The Second Circuit held that 
a protective order could not be used to compel testimony from 
a witness claiming her Fifth Amendment privilege because 
only a grant of immunity could provide equivalent protec-
tion.31G However, the court also held that a protective order is 
not equivalent to a grant of immunity because an order can be 
modified or the government may gain access to the information 
in another way.317 The Second Circuit expressly stated that 
on whether the party testifies or provides information voluntarily). See also supra 
notes 133-37, 143-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of why courts can use 
nothing less than immunity to compel testimony when a party claims a Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
312. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1082 (citing Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 
256-57 (1972» (protective orders are insufficient to compel privileged testimony). 
See FED. R. CIY. P. 26(c) (to be valid, protective orders are not required to guar-
antee absolute confidentiality, offer protection equal to what the deponent wants, 
or to a privilege that may be waived). 
313. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1478 (diminished and eliminated 
interest); see also Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017 (diminished interest by finding that 
protective orders are mere facilitating devices and eliminated the interest by find-
ing the protective order to be a "de facto" grant of immunity). 
314. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475 (finding protective orders to be a 
"de facto" grant of immunity allowed the court to invalidate the interests served 
by protective orders); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18 (court did not have authority 
to immunize witness; therefore, district court should not have quashed grand jury 
subpoena.). 
315. See Andover, 876 F.2d at 1083-84 (court could not use a protective order to 
compel testimony because it offered less protection than immunity). 
316. [d. at 1083. 
317. [d. at 1083-84; Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1224-25 
("The Martindell test . . . does not transform a protective order into a grant of 
immunity because the test allows a protective order to be overcome .... "); see 
also supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's 
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even a protective order issued specifically to conceal informa-
tion from the government was not a "de facto" grant of immu-
nity.31B 
A protective order is not a "de facto" grant of immunity, 
even if its purpose is to shield criminal activity from the gov-
ernment, because immunity guarantees that information given 
or derived will not be used to prosecute the source.319 Unlike 
immunity, a protective order simply restricts dissemination of 
information.320 Additionally, protective orders do not prevent 
the government from using sealed information for prosecution 
if they can gain access to it.321 A "de facto" grant of immunity 
would occur only if a court interfered in a grand jury investiga-
tion by refusing to enforce a subpoena compelling testimony or 
trying to stop a grand jury from prosecuting based on leaked 
information by enforcing an order protecting it.322 Since these 
are not the facts of any case presented, the Fourth, Eleventh 
and Ninth Circuits should consider the interests protective 
orders serve rather than construing protective orders as "de 
facto" grants of immunity.323 
holding. Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits held that a protective order could 
not guarantee confidentiality. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18; Grand Jury Subpoe-
na, 836 F.2d at 1478. 
318. Grand Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1224-25. The Second 
Circuit held that improvidence was the appropriate test to overturn the protective 
order, rather than finding an improper "de facto" grant of immunity. Id. 
319. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (protective orders do not prevent the grand 
jury from continuing its investigation and, unlike immunity, can be modified or 
vacated); Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480 (Sprouse J. dissenting) (protec-
tive orders do not alter the deponent's potential culpability and are not "de facto" 
grants of immunity); see also 18 U.S.C. § 6002. 
320. Compare, Fed. R. ClY. P. 26(c) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003. 
321. See FED. R. ClV. P. 26(c) (the grant of a protective order directly affects 
only the people involved in the civil litigation). The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
both expressed that protective orders do not guarantee that the government will 
not obtain and use the information. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1478; 
Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18. 
322. Cr, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03. 
323. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1475 (the protective order is a "de 
facto" grant of immunity); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18 (the protective order is 
an improper grant of immunity). The Ninth Circuit adopted the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits' findings that a protective order is an improper "de facto" grant of 
immunity by relying on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' "discussion of the fac-
tors" in adopting the per se rule. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226; see also 
supra notes 257-69 and accompanying text discussing the Ninth Circuit's reliance 
on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits for adopting the per se rule. Additionally, the 
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3. Comparison of the Circuits' Balancing of Competing 
Interests 
When courts recognize and weigh competing interests, 
they should apply the Second Circuit's rebuttable presumption 
to uphold protective orders.324 Although the Second and Elev-
enth Circuits did not recognize all the relevant policy interests, 
they alone attempted to balance the competing interests.325 
The Eleventh Circuit found that facilitating civil justice does 
not outweigh the interest in allowing the grand jury access to 
information.326 In contrast, the Second Circuit held that the 
grand jury did not have a significant need under the circum-
stances, and favored the policy interest in facilitating civil 
disputes.327 One factor accounting for this difference is that 
courts adopting the per se rule weigh the competing interests 
in the abstract while the Second Circuit determines the signifi-
cance of each interest in the context of the specific case.328 
By analyzing interests in the specific context presented, 
the Second Circuit found that modifying protective orders in 
favor of grand jury subpoenas did not further the public's in-
terest in law enforcement.329 If protective orders may be easi-
government's position is unaltered because it can still grant immunity, compel 
testimony, or obtain the sealed information in some other way and use it for pros-
ecution. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480 
(Sprouse J. dissenting); see also supra notes 138-45, 199-201 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of why a protective order is not a "de facto" grant of immuni-
ty; see also Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1095-96 (1982) 
(discussion of using protective orders when a party or non-party invokes a Fifth 
Amendment privilege in a civil case). 
324. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 945 F.2d at 1225 (court expressly rejected 
Fourth Circuit's per se rule). 
325. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-17; see, e.g., Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-
96; see also Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (the Fourth Circuit never bal-
anced the competing interests because it found protective orders did not further an 
interest since they were improper "de facto" grants of immunity). 
326. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017. 
327. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866; Grand Jury Sub-
poena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1225-26; see also supra notes 107-108, 129, 155-
56 and accompanying text discussing the Second Circuit's findings that the govern-
ment has the burden of rebutting the presumption to uphold protective orders. 
328. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1479 (Sprouse J. dissenting). 
329. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296; see Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866; see Grand 
Jury Subpoena Deuces Tecum, 945 F.2d at 1225-26; see also supra notes 103-108, 
124-29, 155-56 and accompanying text discussing the Second Circuit's findings that 
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ly modified, litigants will likely claim their right or privilege 
rather than rely on protective orders.33o If parties refuse to 
disclose privileged information, allowing a grand jury access to 
the information will serve no purpose because no information 
will be available.331 The end result of modifying protective 
orders in favor of grand jury subpoenas will cause a significant 
harm to the civil process with no offsetting benefit.332 
The Eleventh Circuit, by considering the competing inter-
ests in the abstract, concluded that the public's interest 
weighed more heavily than private interests.333 The Eleventh 
Circuit incorrectly held that the Second Circuit misunderstood 
the importance of the grand jury's role.334 The Second Circuit 
clearly recognized that the grand jury serves an important 
public interest, but where information exists only due to a pro-
tective order, the public's interest in permitting the grand jury 
access to the information is not furthered by modifying the pro-
tective order.335 
the government has the burden of rebutting the presumption since modification 
would not further the public's interest. 
330. See, e.g., Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96. Both the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits found that a party or deponent must claim their privilege rather than 
relying on a protective order. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477-78; Wil-
liams, 995 F.2d at 1018. 
331. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865. 
332. See id. (without a protective order, parties will not divulge information; 
thus, no information will be available for the government to subpoena. If nO infor-
mation is available to the government, the public's interest in allowing the govern-
ment access to all information is hampered.); see also Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295 
(modifying protective orders disrupts the civil process). 
333. See Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-17 (the court identified the importance of 
each interest, but did not discuss how each would be furthered or harmed if the 
order was modified). 
334. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1020. 
335. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96. All of the Second Circuit's cases rec-
ognize the public's interest in allowing the government access to information as 
significant. However, the public's interest is served only in the individual case, not 
in the long-run, since a court's refusal to grant a protective order will result in 
the party claiming his or her privilege. See also Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865 (infor-
mation would not exist, but for the protective order). See also supra notes 101-
lOB, 124-2B and accompanying text discussing the benefit and harm resulting from 
modifying an order. 
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B. THE BALANCING TEST SHOULD PREVAIL OVER A PER SE 
RULE 
1. Review of The Martindell Test 
In Martindell, the Second Circuit held that the govern-
ment may rebut the presumption against modifying a protec-
tive order by showing a compelling need, extraordinary circum-
stance, or that the court granted the order improvidently.33G 
The court defined an improvident grant as one in which the 
granting judge knew or reasonably should have known that the 
order would facilitate or further criminal activity.337 The Sec-
ond Circuit indicated that a compelling need may exist if there 
is no alternative method for obtaining the information.33B Al-
though the court did not use a strict application of the 
Martindell test, the court's modification of a protective order 
can be viewed as an example of an extraordinary 
circumstance.339 The court also implicitly found an extraordi-
nary circumstance when it modified a protective order regard-
ing business documents that the government could have sub-
poenaed prior to the civillitigation.340 
Judges applying the Martindell test can exercise discretion 
while using case specific facts and evaluating the competing 
336. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (the government can rebut the presumption to 
uphold a protective order by showing specific facts or circumstances surrounding 
the case that demonstrate a compelling need, extraordinary circumstance or im-
providence in the grant of the order). See also supra note 108 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Second Circuit's test. United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 
418 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983) (specific facts permitted the 
court to vacate a protective order); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866 (case remanded to 
determine if facts were sufficient for the government to rebut the presumption to 
uphold the protective order absent improvidence, compelling need or extraordinary 
circumstance). 
337. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66 (2d Cir. 1985); see also supra note 130 and 
accompanying text discussing the standard for improvidence. 
338. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866; see supra note 128 and accompanying text dis-
cussing the Second Circuit's finding. 
339. Davis, 702 F.2d at 422-23; see also supra notes 110-17 and accompanying 
text discussing the court's holding. 
340. Davis, 594 F.2d at 423. The fact that either party could disclose the infor-
mation without the court's consent can also be viewed as an extraordinary circum-
stance requiring modification under Martindell. [d.; see also supra notes 110-17 
and accompanying text discussing the courts use of specific facts to modify the 
order. 
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interests.341 For example, since the policies supporting protec-
tive orders are not meant to increase efficiency at any cost, the 
protective order may protect an illegitimate interest.342 The 
improvidence portion of the Martindell test addresses this 
possibility.343 If a court grants an order improvidently, the 
order protects an illegitimate interest.3« In such a case, mod-
ifying the order would not harm the interests of facilitating 
civil disputes or protecting a deponent's rights and privileg-
es.345 Therefore, by finding improvidence under Martindell, a 
court finds that no interest exists to prevent the grand jury 
from obtaining the information.346 
When an order protects an illegitimate interest, a court 
applying the Martindell test could invalidate the order without 
harming the civil process.347 Conversely, if the order protects 
a legitimate interest, a judicial modification would harm the 
civil judicial process.34S Therefore, if an order protects a legit-
341. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (government can overcome presumption by 
showing specific facts or circumstances surrounding the case that demonstrate 
compelling need, extraordinary circumstance or improvidence in the grant of the 
order); see also Davis, 702 F.2d at 422-423 (court uses specific facts of the case). 
342. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (order can be modified if a "stronger" 
interest is shown); see also Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66 (aiding criminal activity 
is improper; therefore, a court may not use a protective order to do so.). 
343. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66 (protective order that furthers criminal activi-
ty does not protect a legitimate interest and would be granted improvidently). 
344. [d.; see also Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480 (Rule 26 does not 
usurp the powers of the grand jury and peIjury "would obviously justify modifying 
the protective order"). 
345. See, e.g., Davis, 702 F.2d at 422-23 (modification of the order results in no 
harm because whether the order can ensure confidentiality is not decisive whether 
to waive a right or privilege in reliance on the protective order). 
346. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96 (the Martindell test is a balancing 
approach and a finding of improvidence permits a court to vacate the protective 
order; thus, improvidence eliminates the interest served by protective orders and 
tilts the balance in the government's favor.). The other circuits' holdings, that no 
protective order shielding information from the government can be "valid," are 
similar to the Second Circuit's finding of improvidence. However, these other cir-
cuits have concluded without establishing a procedural test by simply holding 
protective orders invalid as "de facto" grants of immunity. See generally, Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1474-78; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017-18; see also su-
pra notes 310-323 and accompanying text discussing the analytical leap in finding 
that protective orders are "de facto" grants of immunity. 
347. See Davis, 702 F.2d at 422 (no harm results by modifying the protective 
order so long as the party had not relied on it). 
348. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96 (protective orders are upheld unless the 
government meets its burden since, absent specific facts to the contrary, protecting 
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imate interest, the government must show that refusing the 
grand jury access would cause greater harm than protecting 
the sealed information.349 The Martindell test addresses this 
premise by allowing a court to modify the protective order if 
the government shows a compelling need or extraordinary 
circumstance.35o 
2. The Per Se Rule 
Courts that adopt the per se rule generally reject the 
Martindell test as unworkable.351 The Eleventh Circuit com-
plained that the Second Circuit had not defined the test's 
terms.352 However, in Palmieri, the Second Circuit defined an 
improvident grant of a protective order as when the judge 
knew or should have known that the order would aid or pro-
mote criminal activity.353 The Second Circuit also suggested 
that if the court knew or should have known that the govern-
ment may want the information, granting the order without 
including this interest in its weighing of the competing inter-
ests would be an "improvident" grant.354 The Eleventh 
Circuit's opinion did not mention these standards.355 
As for "compelling need" or "extraordinary circumstance", 
the dissent in the Fourth Circuit opined that peIjury would 
the civil process from harm outweighs the benefits derived by permitting the gov-
ernment access to sealed information). 
349. See, e.g., id. (Martindell establishes a rebuttable presumption to uphold the 
protective order unless the government can show that the order serves no valid 
interest because it was granted improvidently or that significant harm will result 
if the order is not modified due to an extraordinary circumstance or compelling 
governmental need.). 
350. Id. An extraordinary circumstance may result in a decreased significance to 
the interest of facilitating civil disputes or an increased significance to the public's 
interest or a larger harm accruing to the public interest if the order is not modi-
fied. Compelling need only addresses a greater harm accruing to the public's inter-
est if a court does not modify the order. See generally, id. at 291-296. 
351. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476-78; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1018-20. 
352. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1018-19; see also supra note 228 and accompanying 
text discussing the Eleventh Circuit's argument. 
353. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865; see also supra notes 292-31 and accompanying 
text discussing an appropriate standard for improvidence. 
354. Id. Knowledge of a grand jury investigation is sufficient for a judge to 
know that the government is likely to want the information. Id. 
355. See Williams, 995 F.2d 1013. 
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justify modifying an order.356 Moreover, when a party other 
than the government seeks to modify an order, courts conduct 
a balancing of competing interests similar to Martindell's re-
quirements.357 Hence, it is difficult to understand why the 
test must be rejected for the government, but retained when 
the party seeking the information is a private litigant.358 Al-
though different interests may be involved, the procedural test 
should not be altered.359 
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the Martindell test 
because it found that judges would face a "Hobson's choice" in 
deciding whether to modify an order.360 The "Hobson's choice" 
is based on a judge who must decide whether to modify an 
order after having assured protection when compelling the 
testimony.361 However, this argument fails because courts 
have established that a protective order cannot be used to 
compel testimony.362 Additionally, all of the cases decided by 
courts adopting the per se rule involved a party's voluntary 
waiver of a privilege, rather than one compelled by the 
COurt.363 Since none of these circuits have used or can use a 
356. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1480 (Sprouse J. dissenting). Since 
immunity does not protect testimony from perjury charges, a protective order prob-
ably cannot protect it either. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002. 
357. 8 WRIGlIT & MILLER § 2044.1 (courts balance interests when a third party 
seeks modification of a protective order). 
358. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (The government, in comparison to private 
parties, has much greater power (Le., not all privileges apply, able to grant immu-
nity); therefore, the government is more likely to have access to the infonnation.). 
359. Compare, e.g., Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 864 (recognized competing interests as 
the facilitation of civil disputes and the public's interest in permitting government 
access to all infonnation for criminal investigations) with 8 WRIGlIT & MILLER § 
2044.1 (courts consider various interests including facilitating civil litigation, hann 
to parties if modified, movant's ability to duplicate discovery, expense of duplica-
tion, timeliness of request, etc.). 
360. Williams, 995 F.2d at 1019. See also supra notes 229-31 and accompanying 
text regarding the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of the "Hobson's choice" that the 
Martindell test allegedly creates for judges. 
361. [d. 
362. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1082 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441-
45 (1972); Pillsbury, 459 U.S. 248, 256-257 (1972». 
363. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1469 (all parties and deponents con-
sented); Williams, 995 F.2d at 1014 (party refused to testify until there was con-
sent to a protective order, court did not compel testimony); Janet Greeson's APFU, 
62 F.3d at 1223 (order entered as part of settlement agreement after testimony 
had been voluntarily given). 
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protective order to compel testimony, they have not and will 
not face this "Hobson's choice."364 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Martindell approach be-
cause the government is not generally present when a court 
issues an order, which prevents a court from effectively balanc-
ing the competing interests.365 However, courts do not seem 
to have a problem balancing these interests when a private 
party seeks modification.366 When a private party moves to 
modify a protective order, courts have not invalidated protec-
tive orders simply because parties who may want or need the 
information in the future cannot be predicted at the time the 
order is granted.367 The per se rule clearly differentiates be-
tween private parties and the government, holding that the 
government has a special need that mandates courts to weigh 
the governmental interest before the order is issued.368 Since 
courts cannot predict the future, the per se rule invalidates 
those protective orders that shield information from the gov-
ernment.369 
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits both have found that 
alternatives exist which make protective orders unneces-
sary.370 If the courts actually weighed the competing policy 
364. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1082 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441-
45 (1972); Pillsbury, 459 U.S. 248, 256-257 (1972» (cannot use protective orders to 
compel testimony). Williams, 995 F.2d at 1019 (part of the "Hobson's choice" is 
that a court has compelled the testimony). 
365. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477-78. 
366. 8 WRIGIIT & MILLER § 2044.1. 
367. See id. (discussing foresight and hindsight regarding protective orders). 
368. See id. (courts have not applied the per se rule when a private party 
seeks to modify the protective order). See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 
(no discussion of why government's, but not private parties', interests must be 
weighed before the order is issued); Williams, 995 F.2d 1013 (no discussion of why 
government's, but not private parties', interests must be weighed before the order 
is issued); Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d 1222 (no discussion of why 
government's, but not private parties', interests must be weighed before the order 
is issued). The Ninth Circuit explicitly held that it analyzes "whether to modify its 
protective orders for the benefit of a private litigant, and for a grand jury, dis-
tinctly differently." Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1223 n.l. 
369. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477; see generally, Williams, 995 
F.2d 1013. 
370. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1476; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1018; See 
also supra note 184 and accompanying text for a discussion of the alternative 
tools. 
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interests, alternatives to protective orders would be one factor 
of many considered in deciding whether a grand jury subpoena 
should prevail.371 However, as used, alternatives are present-
ed as collateral support for a conclusion reached without prop-
er analysis.372 Additionally, unlike these alternatives, proce-
dural rules governing protective orders were moved to FRCP 
26 and made applicable to all forms of discovery to curb dis-
covery abuse.373 These alternatives are not adequate replace-
ments for "the long-standing role played by Rule 26(c) [protec-
tive ordersl."374 
3. Comparison of the Balancing Test with the Per Se Rule 
The Fourth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits claimed they 
weighed the competing interests to find that protective orders 
improperly shielded information from the grand jury.375 How-
ever, these courts identified and weighed these interests in the 
abstract, rather than in relation to the particular facts of the 
cases.376 The courts identified only the "efficient and speedy" 
interest outlined in FRCP 1 and served by protective orders, 
rather than the '~ust" portion permitting orders to protect 
individual and societal rights and privileges from discovery 
abuse.377 These courts also declined to temper the importance 
of grand jury investigations by recognizing established limits 
on judicial authority over grand juries.378 To fairly weigh the 
371. See e.g., Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96 (a number of factors must be con-
sidered). 
372. See generally Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (lack of analysis). 
373. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 2036, 2043; Miller, supra note 274, at 452. 
374. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1481 (Sprouse J. dissenting). 
375. Id. at 1477; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1017; Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 
1226-27. 
376. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471-73; Williams, 995 F.2d at 1016-18. 
See also supra notes 328-35 and accompanying text discussing the courts' balanc-
ing in the abstract. 
377. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471-73; see also Williams, 995 
F.2d at 1016-18. Rule 1 of the FRCP calls for the "just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action," not simply the "speedy and inexpensive" resolution. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. See also supra notes 13-42, 282-87, 292-93 for a discussion of 
protective orders under the FRCP and the courts' narrow construction of this in-
terest. 
378. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471-73; see also Williams, 995 
F.2d at 1016-18. See also supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text discussing the 
limits of the grand jury and the courts authority over it. 
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competing interests, the courts should fully identify them to 
clarify their relevance to the case being addressed. 
Regardless of a court's conclusion regarding the competing 
interests, the specific facts or circumstances of the case must 
be allowed to alter the balance.379 The Fourth, Eleventh, and 
Ninth Circuits' per se rule eliminates this possibility by reject-
ing a balancing approach as unworkable and construing protec-
tive orders that shield information from the government as 
improper "de facto" grants of immunity.380 Noting that protec-
tive orders cannot be considered equal to immunity and that a 
similar balancing is undertaken when private parties are in-
volved, courts should recognize that modifying protective or-
ders can harm relevant interests.38l Whether the public's in-
terest in facilitating grand jury investigations is greater than 
the interest in upholding protective orders can only be deter-
mined using a balancing approach that integrates the facts of 
the case.382 
If the Ninth Circuit had applied Martindell, the court 
could have found a rebuttable presumption to modify the pro-
tective order. Had that occurred, the burden would be placed 
on appellants to overcome the presumption. The facts of the 
case do not suggest that appellants had a compelling need or 
that an extraordinary circumstance existed, other than 
appellant's reliance upon the protective order when waiving 
her Fifth Amendment right.383 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
could have applied the Martindell test to find that appellant's 
379. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296 (the Martindell test pennits a judge to 
modify an order if the specific facts demonstrate a compelling need, extraordinary 
circumstance, or that the order was granted improvidently). See also supra notes 
357-59 and accompanying text discussing courts consideration of specific facts when 
balancing interests where a private litigant has moved to modify an order. 
380. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1471-73; see also Williams, 995 
F.2d at 1016-18. 
381. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 1226 (a vital function of protective orders under 
the FRCP is to ensure that the goals of Rule 1 are met). See also supra notes 13-
42 discussing the role of protective orders under the FRCP as both facilitating the 
civil process and safeguarding litigants against the broad scope of discovery. 
382. Compare, Martindell, 594 F.2d at 1224 (the Martindell test allows an order 
to be modified using the specific facts of the case) with Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 
F.2d at 1477 (the per se rule is automatic and does not pennit judges to consider 
interests or facts). 
383. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1222-23. 
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Fifth Amendment right did not merit court protection since it 
implied shielding criminal activity.384 Unless the appellant 
could have shown otherwise, the Ninth Circuit could have 
found improvidence in granting the order having weighed all 
relevant interests in the context of the case's specific facts. 
Although the per se rule is easily applied and litigants 
face no uncertainty as to whether a protective order will be 
modified if the government wants the information, the "price" 
of its clarity is very high. The per se rule eliminates the 
judiciary's role in applying specific facts to the law and takes 
away litigants' rights to decide whether to rely on a protective 
order. 385 The legislature, not the judiciary, should decide 
whether a per se rule is an appropriate policy solution.386 Un-
til then, courts should use a balancing approach, like 
Martindell, which allows them to weigh the competing inter-
ests in light of facts and circumstances of a particular case.387 
384. See Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 866 (if the judge knew or should have known 
that the order would further or aid criminal activity, it was granted improvident-
ly); see also supra note 131 and accompanying text discussing this standard of 
improvidence. 
385. Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1481 (Sprouse J. dissenting). 
386. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REv. 177, 
346-47 (1991) (prospective law making is a legislative function). See also T. Alex-
ander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
979-80, 984-87 (1987) (arguing that balancing interests is a legislative function, 
but "ad hoc" balancing is more justifiable for the judiciary than "definitional" bal-
ancing that results in a per se rule). 
387. See generally, David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence 
Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937 (1990) (judges need to have discretion and 
flexability). There has been a general trend in legal reform over the last century 
toward flexible standards and away from fixed "per se" rules. [d. at 956; see also 
Aleinikoff, supra note 386, at 343 n.6 (citing articles revealing the persuasiveness 
of moving from rules to balancing accross many doctrinal areas). See also The 
Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARv. L. REV. 111, 234-36 (1995) 
(per se rule applied to security law is inappropriate because it fails to account for 
specific circumstances); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 386, at 979-80 (opposing per 
se rule because there will generally be special circumstances deserving of an ex-
ception). See also Thomas E. Kauper, Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial, 75 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 893-94 (1987) (advocating a very limited role for per se rules under 
antitrust law). The idea that courts should adjudicate cases using their "best cur-
rent understanding" of the law supports the Second Circuit's case-by-case balanc-
ing. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REV. 177, 
346-47 (1991) (courts should adjudicate cases using "their best current understand-
ing" of the law). 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits have considered 
whether a party providing potentially incriminating discovery 
material in a civil case, and of which the court was aware, had 
authority to shield that evidence from a grand jury.388 The 
per se rule, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, provides that grand 
jury subpoenas prevail over all protective orders regardless of 
a litigant's motivation for requesting the order or the circum-
stances and knowledge surrounding its issuance.389 The 
Ninth Circuit, adopting the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' 
arguments, rejected the Second Circuit's balancing approach. 
That approach would have allowed the court to invalidate the 
protective order by finding that the orders had been granted 
improvidently. The Ninth Circuit, in its cursory review of Sec-
ond Circuit cases, declined to discuss this Second Circuit hold-
ing.390 By· adopting the per se rule, the Ninth Circuit held 
that it wished to promote the public's significant interest in 
facilitating grand jury investigations. However, the Ninth 
Circuit's decision went well beyond the narrow issue presented. 
388. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1469 (4th Cir. 1988) (depo-
nents requested protective order due to an on-going grand jury investigation and 
their concern that their testimony may incriminate them). Williams v. United 
States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1014 11th Cir. 1993) (Williams requested a protective order 
to prevent a grand jury that was investigating him from using his testimony to 
indict him). Appellant's Opening Brief at 1-2, United States v. Janet Greeson's 
APFU, 62 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-56125) (concern over on-going grand 
jury investigation led to request of protective order); Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, 
United States v. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-
56125) (appellant's alleged that confidentiality order indicated concern over Fifth 
Amendment right throughout litigation). 
389. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 F.3d at 1226-27 (grand jury subpoenas automati-
cally "trump" protective orders). 
390. Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1985) (the Second Cir-
cuit held that if the court knew or reasonably should have known that issuing the 
protective order would further or aid criminal activity, the court acted with im-
providence in granting the order). The Ninth Circuit read this case as reaffirming 
Martinckll, but declined to discuss the case any further. Janet Greeson's APFU, 62 
F.3d at 1223-24. 
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Although the Ninth Circuit suggests an offsetting benefit, it is 
minimal compared to the significant harm the per se rule caus-
es to the civil process. 
Dane L. Steffenson· 
• Georgia State University College of Law, Class of 1997. 
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